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ABSTRACT 
A 2010 review of 96 defense acquisition programs showed average delivery rates are 22 
months behind schedule and the cumulative cost growth exceeded $296 billion.  With 
budget cuts looming, a small window of opportunity exists to enact reforms improving 
the health and solvency of the defense acquisition portfolio.  First, we must leverage the 
technology investments made into collaborative software suites such as product lifecycle 
management (PLM) to align the requirements, design, engineering, logistics, 
maintenance, and operational data environments into one comprehensive activity.  
Implementing a PLM strategy will present cost-saving opportunities through faster 
information access, improved data reuse, social networking, and virtual collaboration and 
testing.  PLM systems have the ability to capture and organize vast amounts of data.  
Because through human interaction data becomes knowledge, lean product design is a 
philosophy that can change how we think, learn, use, and build up on that knowledge.  By 
going beyond merely attacking waste by finding a balance between waste reduction and 
value addition, total ownership costs can be reduced drastically.  These reforms have the 
ability to fundamentally change how we design, build, and maintain the fleet, making the 
defense portfolio solvent and thus continuing to fulfill the needs of the warfighter.  
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The United States has a broad set of national security missions that it must be 
prepared to complete.  To accomplish these missions, an equally broad set of weapon 
systems must be developed by the acquisition community, providing capabilities to our 
warfighters and ensuring they hold the advantage regardless of the mission or task.  To 
accomplish its assigned missions, the United States Navy builds and operates the most 
sophisticated, technologically advanced ships in the world.  Since 2002, Congress has 
appropriated over $74.1 billion for the construction of new aircraft carriers, nuclear 
submarines, surface combatants, and amphibious transport ships (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2009b). 
Any inefficiency through the acquisition process will consume resources, leaving 
fewer available to invest in the weapon systems of tomorrow.  One indicator that 
inefficiencies are present in the current process is the unexpected cost growth and 
schedule delays of recent programs.  A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report (Table 1) reviewed the performance of 96 major defense acquisition programs in 
2009 and showed that average delivery rates are 22 months behind schedule and running 
at a cumulative cost growth of $296 billion (GAO, 2010). 
Table 1.  Analysis of the DoD Acquisition Portfolio  
(From GAO, 2010)  
 
 
The Honorable Gene Taylor, congressional representative from Mississippi, 
speaking on the state of the acquisition portfolio, said “Our ships are simply too 
expensive. [...] I believe the Navy needs to look very hard at their requirements process to 
determine if marginal extra capability is worth significant construction or integration 
costs” (Opening Statement, 2009). 
Congressman Taylor was speaking to the fact that through fiscal year (FY)09, the 
Navy has seen cost growth across every major current program, the worst being Littoral 
Combat Ship, which saw an increase of 208% from the original estimate, as shown in 
Table 2 (Department of Defense [DoD], 2010).  Because of these high costs, Congress or 
the Navy could decide to kill the troubled program, or pay the additional cost growth 
either by placing an additional burden on the tax payers or by cutting the funds from 
other programs. Both of these actions would result in fewer capabilities for warfighters.  
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Table 2.  Program Budget Cost Growth for Ships Under Construction in 2009 
(After DoD, 2010) 
% Change to date
Then Year $ Quantity $/hull Then Year $ Quantity $/hull Then Year $
CVN 78 36,082$          3 12,027$          40,546$            3 13,515$          12.4%
DDG 1000 36,296$          10 3,630$            19,771$            3 6,590$            17.4%
DDG 51 20,118$          23 875$                80,408$            71 1,133$            21.4%
LCS 1,212$            2 606$                3,733$              2 1,866$            208.0%
LPD 17 10,762$          12 897$                18,659$            11 1,696$            101.0%
SSN 774 71,081$          30 2,369$            91,394$            30 3,046$            28.6%







The expensive nature of ships referred to by Congressman Taylor is not limited to 
the acquisition costs.  Total Ownership Cost (TOC) includes all costs associated with the 
research, development, procurement, operation, and disposal of an individual weapon 
system over its full life.  Commenting on the high cost of weapon systems, General 
Joseph W. Ralston, former commander of Air Combat Command, has observed that “The 
B-1 bomber cost of ownership is more threatening to the aircraft than the enemy” (Reed, 
2003). 
Traditionally, the cost to procure a system (as shown in Figure 1) is 
approximately 28% of the total ownership cost, with the remainder representing the cost 
to operate and maintain the product through its lifecycle and eventual disposal (General 
Accounting Office [GAO], 2003b).   
 
  
Figure 1.  Typical DoD Program Life Cycle Cost, 30-Year Service Life 
(From GAO, 2003b)  
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While a majority of the TOC will occur during the operations-and-support phase 
of a program, Figure 2 demonstrates how decisions made while crafting requirements and 
maturing the design will dictate operating and support expenditures. This is similar to 
purchases made with a credit card—you can buy anything today, but at the end of the 
month, the bill will be waiting. Making poor decisions early can leave a program with 
bills that cannot be paid. Failing to consider TOC in the acquisition strategy is like 
making an impulse purchase without considering the real cost.  The GAO cites studies 
demonstrating that by the time 10% of lifecycle costs have been spent, about 85% of 
operating and support costs have been determined by set requirements.  By the time the 
product is ready for production, 90% of TOC is locked in, while only 28% has been 
expended (GAO, 2003b).  Understanding the ramifications early decisions have on the 
TOC will help to ensure that decisions made are the best in regard to the entire lifecycle. 
 
  
Figure 2.  Operating and Support Costs through the Acquisition Process  
(From GAO, 2003b) 
 
In a 2003 study on ways to reduce the TOC, the GAO identified three primary 
reasons that weapon systems have experienced costly maintenance problems and low 
readiness rates. First, during the early stage design, when decisions have the greatest 
effect, the Department of Defense (DoD) overemphasizes technical performance 
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capabilities at the expense of operating, support, and readiness.  Second, the reliance on 
immature technologies to meet performance goals decreases the ability to design weapon 
systems with high reliability. As the technology matures, the design evolves to 
accommodate differences from the original estimate, sometimes the requirements of the 
technology are not fully understood until after construction has begun. Immature 
technologies limit the ability to plan for inclusion of various cost-saving manufacturing 
techniques, such as open systems or parts reduction. Third, the current organizational 
structure limits collaboration and feedback between departments, creating stovepipes 
responsible for requirements generation, product development, and maintenance. The 
current system the DoD uses to capture and analyze currently fielded systems-operation 
and maintenance data is unreliable, making it difficult to understand the total cost of 
operations and support.  These stovepipes prohibit the proper exchange of information, 
resulting in inefficient behavior such as ship alterations scheduled immediately upon 
delivery, versus working with the builder to make the corrections or improvements while 
in production (GAO, 2003b).  By enacting reforms addressing root causes behind the cost 
escalation and schedule delays during procurement and making conscious decisions that 
positively influence TOC, the Navy can make more efficient use of the appropriated 
budget.  However, being good stewards of taxpayer dollars is not the only reason to 
consider changing how the Naval acquisition community operates.   
The U.S. government is projected to spend $3.5 trillion in FY10—approximately 
20% of gross domestic product (GDP).  Of that amount, 38% ($1.37 trillion) is 
considered “discretionary” spending and funds the 12 major federal government agencies 
and departments.  The largest of those is the Department of Defense (DoD), which 
consumes nearly half of the discretionary budget, or $663 billion (Office of Management 
and Budget [OMB], n.d.).  
The DoD is a major target for spending reductions because it is 8.5 times larger 
than the next largest department.  Figure 3 shows that based on historic trends, cuts in 
defense spending should be expected.  Connie Bowling, a senior TOC advisor for Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Navy headquarters, points out that after a major 
war period, defense spending has contracted by 30% and then risen by 30% over the 
course of the next war (McPherson & Bowling, 2009).   
Figure 3 shows that we may already be past the peak of this spending cycle.  This 
conclusion coincides with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s comments during a 
speech at Eisenhower Library in Kansas, during which he said, “Given America’s 
difficult economic circumstances and perilous fiscal condition, military spending on 
things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny. [ …] The gusher 
has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time” (Dreazen, 2010).   As 
public opinion continues to exert tremendous pressure on the government to become 
more accountable for its spending, the probability increases that the defense budget will 
be cut.  The DoD should prepare for these cuts by ensuring that best practices are 
implemented now, to maximize the value delivered to the warfighters and avoid the need 
for hasty decisions as budgets are cut.       
 
    
Figure 3.  National Defense Outlays FY00 ($B)  
(From McPherson & Bowling, 2009) 
  
When the hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan finally end, it is highly probable that 
cuts to the defense budget will shortly follow to compensate for other areas of national 
interest that have been financially neglected.  These hostilities have put an incredible 
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stress on the military’s equipment—not only has the operational environment been brutal, 
but in order to keep systems operationally available, regular maintenance has been 
deferred or ignored.  For example, helicopters are flying two or three times their planned 
usage rates. Tank crews are driving more than 4,000 miles a year, five times the normal 
rate. Truck fleets that convoy supplies down Iraq’s bomb-laden roads are running at six 
times the planned mileage (Tyson, 2006).   
An estimated $17 billion-plus worth of military equipment is destroyed or worn 
out each year, blasted by bombs, ground down by desert sand, or used up to nine times 
the rate of expenditure compared to times of peace (Hochberg, 2007).  This equipment 
must be repaired or replaced. At the same time, funds are needed to build the systems of 
tomorrow that will be ready to replace the old or worn-down systems.   
To accomplish all of these goals, the acquisition process must be very efficient 
with the funds appropriated, to develop systems utilizing best practices that strive to find 
a balance between maximizing capabilities for the warfighter and minimizing the TOC, 
which causes a strain on budgets. 
In order to address the root causes behind the cost volatility and schedule delays, 
as well as make prudent TOC decisions based on the entire lifecycle, the Navy needs to 
take action.  Investment in the right technologies can provide the workforce capability 
and features that can lead to an improved knowledge base.  Improved knowledge can lead 
to informed decision making and to building an organizational history that ensures 
lessons are learned from mistakes instead of repeated, which leads to reforming the 
practices, processes, and organizations and to making better use of the available 
resources.     
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is needed is a balance between the design selected to meet the warfighters’ 
needs and the resources (funding, technology, design knowledge, engineering capacity, 
etc.) available to transform the idea into a functioning product.  The following research 
questions established the framework and served as an underlying guide throughout this 
research:             
1. How can a technology such as collaborative product lifecycle management (PLM) 
be used to improve the acquisition process?  
 
2. What reforms to the acquisition process are possible, complimenting, or 
supplementing the capabilities provided by collaborative PLM, helping ensure 




II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used is non-numerical and descriptive and will apply 
reasoned arguments supported by external sources. This is an applied, qualitative 
research methodological approach. The goal of this study is to find a solution to improve 
the performance of our acquisition programs.  Staying inside the applied research 
approach, the solutions were crafted from well-supported and accepted theories and 
principles.  The research is categorized as qualitative because the focus is on experience, 
aimed to acquire the implications and opinions describing the situation, as opposed to 
numerically prove or disprove a hypothesis through experimentation.   
Due to the immensity and complexity of ship lifecycle, systems analysis based 
studies should be conducted to examine and evaluate a variety of issues such as 
requirements development, technology maturity, construction, operation, and 
sustainment.  This thesis demonstrates how the collaborative PLM tool suite can 
supplement other reforms of the acquisition process to deliver a product that meets 
requirements while improving the return on investment.   
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
The research objectives are twofold.  The first is to find companies that have had 
success addressing similar issues plaguing DoD acquisitions and to determine whether 
these commercial best practices offer opportunities to improve the outcomes in DoD 
acquisitions and aid its efforts to improve the value-to-cost ratio of its fleet. The second is 
to determine if a PLM approach could facilitate these practices. 
One of the best opportunities to reduce the risk associated with an acquisition 
program is early in the design phase where the program has the greatest flexibility and a 
course correction results in minimal disruption and the need for rework.  This thesis does 
not exclude any phase of an acquisition program, but focuses primarily on reforms 
applicable to the time early in the design phase.  The belief is that a solid design is the 
foundation of a successful program.  A helpful attribute of a solid foundation is the 
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integration of each phase of a product lifecycle, in order to capture experience and 
knowledge unique to that phase, and then use this knowledge to influence positive 
decisions during design.  This research will also show ways this knowledge can assist the 
design team in optimizing value to the stakeholders across all phases.   
C. RESEARCH DATA SAMPLE 
A multitude of literature, including government white papers, industry point 
papers, GAO reports, program lessons learned, books, and journal articles concerning 
best practices and lessons learned during the product development phase were studied for 
this thesis.  The opinions formed were based on which processes offered the greatest 
return on investment and how current technologies can act as a facilitator for 
implementation of the identified processes.   
The author was granted access and was provided with internal documents such as 
lessons learned and whitepapers, as well as met or spoke with representatives from 
current Navy programs such as LPD 17, DDG 1000, LCS, SSN 774, and CVN 78.  
Observation of active programs’ daily operations provided insight on issues experienced, 
reasoning behind decisions made, and lessons learned from mistakes, among other 
general observations.  These programs were selected because they are current and offered 
the best perspective of the state of the acquisition process.   
The United Airlines engine maintenance facility in San Francisco also provided 
data and access that aided my research.  They offered meetings with engineers and tours 
of the facility, to see how United closed the information loop throughout the engine 
lifecycle. Other private-sector companies provided information, white papers, interviews, 
and case studies; however, due to proprietary information, my access was limited.   
The capabilities of collaborative PLM and the evolution of LEAN product 
development (LPD) was learned from literature provided and interviews conducted with 
professionals, including the founder of Huthwaite Innovation Institute and experts from 
Siemens Product Lifecycle Management Software, Dassault Systems Solutions, John 
Stark Associates, SofTech, Ship Constructor Shipbuilding Software, and the Center for 
Naval Shipbuilding Technology.   This helped to develop an understanding of how LPD 
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philosophy was built into and supported by collaborative PLM tools.  These experts 
helped me understand the best practices and lessons they had learned from commercial 
programs, which have successfully integrated collaborative PLM tools into their 
processes, and most importantly, how these practices can be applied to naval acquisition 
programs. 
1. Data Collection Process 
To compensate for lack of personal experimentation, my research leveraged 
experiments and projects conducted by both the government and the private industry to 
address the issues discussed in the paper.  The GAO has created extensive case studies 
examining commercial best practices, and it has explored weaknesses in the DoD 
acquisition framework.  These reports reinforced lessons learned from the programs and 
companies that made data available, and they introduced new concepts and ideas.  
Several of these studies were utilized to determine how the best practices identified by 
GAO could apply to DoD acquisitions and be facilitated by the collaborative PLM 
approach.        
2. Data Analysis 
The author obtained an understanding of the government shipbuilding processes, 
insight into recent lead-ship programs and specific commercial practices while 
conducting a series of interviews with government subject-matter experts from 
NAVSEA, the Center for Innovation in Ship Design, Ship System Integration and Design 
Department, former NAVSEA chief architects, current Naval architects, Supervisors of 
Shipbuilding, program managers, and Program Executive Office Ships representatives.   
In particular, the ASNE Day 2010 conference titled Engineering the Affordable 
Global Navy through Innovation offered a tremendous opportunity for me to listen to 
panels of experts representing both the government and private industry discussing the 
impact of not controlling ship TOC, as well as their thoughts on initiatives that could 
address current issues.  This conference afforded me the ability to broaden my 
perspective by meeting with representatives from commercial shipyards responsible for 
developing complex ship solutions: Northrop Grumman, Austal, and General Dynamics.  
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Meeting with individuals from these companies provided the opportunity to hear their 
opinions on current efforts as well potential solutions that have yet to be attempted. The 
author was also able to present his own opinions, which led to a discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposals, leading to a more realistic product.  One of 
the most thought provoking events during this conference was the Global Shipbuilding 
Executive Summit, where global leaders representing both the private and public sectors 
held a brainstorming session on potential solutions to address the unsustainable trend of 
poor cost, schedule, and technical performance across the defense portfolio.  This data 
established a foundation of understanding necessary to complete this research.    
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III. PRODUCT LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT  
A. BACKGROUND 
This section provides an introduction to a technology that can assist with 
implementing the new possible strategy, collaborative PLM, a promising tool that, as its 
name implies, allows for the management of the product from the earliest stages of the 
lifecycle, all the way through to disposal.   
Follow-on chapters will present practices and processes that can help reform the 
naval acquisition community.  The recommended reforms either take advantage of the 
capabilities, or they are needed to support the deployment of a collaborative PLM across 
the naval acquisition enterprise.  The reforms are based on lessons learned and best 
practices from companies that have successfully institutionalized collaborative PLM into 
their organizations.  None of these reforms are groundbreaking; in fact, the proven 
practices and process have been successfully implemented by several DoD programs.  
However, on a whole, our corporate knowledge never seems to improve as the successes 
or lessons learned from the failures are isolated and not effectively communicated across 
the portfolio. It is not only necessary to improve the practices and processes, thus, 
improving the organizational productivity, but also a new strategy is necessary to learn 
and retain corporate knowledge, to prevent taking any steps backwards in order to move 
forward.    
The Navy is constantly looking for initiatives to address weaknesses or correct 
deficiencies that lead to problems such as cost overruns and schedule delays, among 
others.  However, whether due to size, authority, or some other reason, most of these 
initiatives have been limited to one functional area or even a subdivision of one 
functional area, such as design, engineering, manufacturing, sales, or service.  For 
instance, LEAN manufacturing has eliminated a lot of waste from the manufacturing 
realm, but generally does not attempt to address the waste encountered throughout the 
entire lifecycle.   
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However, optimizing performance in one or even a series of functional areas does 
not necessarily result in the optimization of the entire organization.  The problem is that 
different departments of organizations have become silos of information. Collaborative 
PLM links the different functional areas through shared product information, breaks 
down the silos, and gains benefits from a shared base of information.  For instance, 
imagine a car designed to take advantage of the most efficient sequence of construction.  
The car company could take the savings from construction to undercut the competition 
and expect this new car to be very successful.  However, if this new design overlooked 
that the only way to change oil was to remove the entire engine block, requiring an 
expensive overhaul of the car every 3,000 miles, it would not be very appealing to car 
buyers.  The designers could misdiagnose the reason behind the poor sales figures and 
add additional cup holders to attempt to increase the appeal.  A mechanic knows the real 
reason that the car is unpopular, but if that knowledge is never communicated and 
captured, this new design, which might overall be a tremendous improvement, will be 
abandoned as a failed design.  Collaborative PLM enables an organization to completely 
integrate and then leverage everything related to the product, in an attempt to maximize 
productivity.  Collaborative PLM uses information technology and organizational 
practices and processes to improve efficiencies both within and, more importantly, across 
the traditional functional divisions.   
A common theme during the ASNE Day 2010 conference titled “Engineering the 
Affordable Global Navy through Innovation” was the voicing of concern over the cost 
escalation across the Navy acquisition portfolio.  Adding to this concern was the lack of 
results achieved by various cost-reduction strategies.  An advantage of collaborative PLM 
is that it does not address a problem from solely a cost-reduction perspective. As with the 
car design example, collaborative PLM offers the ability to facilitate increased 
innovation, functionality, and quality, by organizing the intellectual capital of an 
organization.  As the old adage goes, “you can’t simply save your way to prosperity” 
(Grieves, 2006). Building better, more creative, and more useful products with the same 
or fewer resources can drive productivity; it is a better business model than simply 
cutting costs.   
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B. COLLABORATIVE PLM DEFINED    
The origins of collaborative PLM lie in the computer-aided design (CAD) market 
and how it initially generated designs—first 2D and now 3D.  As technology progressed, 
the CAD programs started incorporating more knowledge capabilities into their drawings 
(e.g., material characteristics, notes, part numbers).  This change accompanied programs 
that linked other data, not associated directly with the CAD file (engineering data 
management (EDM) and product data management (PDM)).  Computer-integrated 
manufacturing (CIM) was created, which could use the CAD models for computerized 
machining, simulation, or testing.  While all these steps were useful and had similar 
goals, not being integrated meant they were islands of automation, creating bottlenecks or 
errors, as information had to be manually transferred from one tool to the next, if it was 
transferred at all.  This meant that even if individual activities or tasks were efficient, the 
overall practices and processes used and products created still had room to improve.  The 
success of an organization centers on the ability to remain in control versus being 
controlled by its products.  In other words, think of the difference between laying out a 
plan and executing it, making calculated decisions and understanding the ramifications, 
versus constantly moving from one emergency to the next, trying to put out fires, making 
snap decisions without thinking the problem through.  Loss of control during 
development leads to delayed schedules, unexpected costs, or the creation of a product 
that does not meet requirements.  Loss of control during operations could result in user 
frustration, unsustainable TOC, or, in the worst cases, injury or death (Stark, 2005). 
It is important to note that collaborative PLM is not a definition of a piece (or 
pieces) of technology (Figure 4). It is a business approach that can align and increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of activities by leveraging software applications and process 
improvements.  In this respect, it is more of a strategy than a system.  As a strategy, not a 
system, collaborative PLM can be configured to meet the unique aspects of any 
organization.  A company can invest in as many or as few collaborative PLM 
components as necessary to meet their unique needs.  This eases the hindrance of a large 
capital investment as well as allows organizations to focus on one area at a time and not 
become overwhelmed by trying to change too much at once.   
 
Figure 4. Collaborative PLM Across the Lifecycle 
  
In the following section, we can examine how two technical publications have 
tried to answer the question “What is collaborative PLM?”  
CIMdata (“Product Lifecycle Management,” n.d.), an independent PLM 
consulting firm, defined PLM as,  
A strategic business approach that applies a consistent set of business solutions 
that support the collaborative creation, management, dissemination, and use of 
product definition information across the extended enterprise from concept to end 
of life of a product or plant- integrating people, processes, business systems, and 
information. (p. 1) 
A second definition comes from CIO Magazine, a publication whose mission is to 
provide technology and business leaders with insight and analysis on information-
technology (IT) trends. CIO magazine (2003) stated the following about the evolution of 
PLM and its role in achieving business goals: 
Product lifecycle management is an integrated, information-driven approach to all 
aspects of a product’s life, from its design through manufacture, deployment, and 
maintenance, culminating in the product’s removal from service and final 
disposal.  PLM software suites enable accessing, updating, manipulating, and 
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reasoning about product information that is being produced in a fragmented and 
distributed environment.  Another definition of PLM is the integration of business 
systems to manage a product’s lifecycle. (Stackpole, 2003, p. 1)    
There is a common theme between these two definitions: By creating, sharing, and using 
all forms of product related information, we can trade information for wasted time, 
energy, and material to ensure the most efficient use of physical resources.      
Collaborative PLM can help manage a product better, but the real benefit is that it 
strives to manage all products better in a fully integrated portfolio.  Dan Billingsley has 
over 30 years of acquisition experience: When asked his view on DoD acquisition, he 
argued that the structure has become heavily product centric, with too much focus given 
to the performance of the product, while forgetting how we got to that particular point (D. 
Billingsley, personal communications, April 5, 2010).  He argued that we need to learn 
from our successes as well as our failures and fix the practices and processes used during 
the lifecycle, in order to ensure the entire portfolio is successful.  Collaborative PLM 
offers a way to restore the balance because it emphasizes, “how a business works,” just as 
much as, “what is being created” (CIMdata, n.d.). 
The following paragraph from Product Lifecycle Management by Anitti 
Saaksvuori and Anselmi Immonen (2008) perfectly answers the question, “What is 
PLM?”: 
PLM is an organized, controlled strategy for developing and then 
managing products and all their associated information.  The central theme 
of PLM is the creation, preservation, and storage of information relating to 
the company’s products and activities, in order to ensure the fast, easy and 
trouble-free finding, refining, distribution and reutilization of the data 
required for daily operations.  In other words, work that has been done 
should remain exploitable, regardless of place, time, or—within prescribed 
limits, naturally—data ownership.  At the same time, the idea is to convert 
data managed by a company’s employees, skilled persons and specialists 
into company capital in an easily manageable and sharable form. (p. 32) 
Collaborative PLM can help improve the productivity across the defense 
acquisition community by capturing and using data the first time it is created.  Time 
previously wasted searching for or recreating product data can be spent collaborating 
with other experts on how to improve the product.     
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C. PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE PLM STRATEGY 
1. Focus on the Product 
The shipbuilding industry is a product-focused business, meaning the portfolio 
may contain many variants of a single product line, each with similar specifications, 
parts, drawings, manufacturing techniques, or operations, as opposed to an assembly line 
organization that churns out an indefinite quantity of one identical product.  These 
variants could be different building blocks of either the same class, or common 
components or systems across all classes.  The benefits of the collaborative PLM strategy 
are realized when lessons learned from the first generation are applied to all subsequent 
generations, in order to decrease their cost and time for development.  The second 
generation may reuse 75% of the parts from the previous generation, decreasing the time 
and resources spent designing and verifying the second generation design (Stark, 2005). 
Co-locating experts with diverse backgrounds as members of the design team has 
benefits to the program.  Teams with representatives from marketing, design, 
engineering, operations, manufacturing, service, testing, quality, and logistics can make 
better collective decisions, reducing bottlenecks, rework, and wait times by sharing 
knowledge.  With each iteration, the collective knowledge expands, to the benefit of 
future projects.  The teams’ combined knowledge of design, process, material, 
manufacturing, quality, and customer requirements enables them to deliver first-time 
quality in a product, a product that has a better fit to customer needs, reduced costs, and a 
faster to-market time.  While collocation is preferred, sometimes it is not feasible to 
collocate the people that have the authority to make decisions. Collaborative PLM gives 
organizations the ability to gain some of the same benefits through its collaboration tools.   
2. Collaborative PLM Involves Customers by Listening to Feedback 
It is important to listen to the customer and ensure that the requirements, 
expectations, features, and wishes are reflected in the delivered product, but listening to 
the customer is the minimum. A better solution is to involve the customer directly in the 
design from the very beginning.  With a customer empowered to make decisions as a 
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member of the cross-functional team, problems can be identified sooner, thus avoiding 
expensive rework or, worse, resolving the problem too late, leading to an unsatisfied 
customer.   
Another way to gain valuable insight from the customer is by receiving feedback 
on fielded products. Customers may be frustrated that a particular system is not operating 
as expected, or they may need help completing a particular piece of maintenance.  
Helping operators with these frustrations can give designers ideas about how to improve 
the product further. The designers can capture this knowledge and make sure it is 
reflected in the follow-on design. 
Sensors can capture feedback directly from the product.  Maintainers will be able 
to monitor products to trace when a particular system begins operating out of the normal 
operating range and trouble shoot if its operators need training or if the system needs 
maintenance.  Designers will be able to determine if a particular system was over-
engineered or can be optimized for actual operations.      
3. Collaborative PLM Offers More than Cost Savings 
The unsustainable trend of cost escalation is one of the main drives for 
undertaking acquisition reform.  Money is a finite resource, and the lack of money is 
forcing program managers to take a hard look at the business model to determine how 
things can be done better.  However, it is important to remember that a goal to solely 
minimize cost is shortsighted.  Programs are not started because they are the cheapest, but 
because warfighters have needs and new products have the ability to meet their needs.   
During an interview, Ron Watson, global product data manager for ITT 
Industries, commented that: 
Restricting the focus to cost reduction, what you’re essentially doing is 
sacrificing the needs and the functions needed by the customer. [...] The 
greatest value is really a function of [delivering] what the customer wants, 
and cost is just something that you try to drive down. [...]If you use just 
cost as an arbitrary determining factor, then you're limiting yourself. 
(Teresko, 2004a, p. 1)  
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Any changes recommended for the Navy’s strategy must be focused on delivering 
increased value to the warfighter, not endlessly chasing cost reductions.   
4. Implementing Processes, Techniques, Methodology 
Various techniques have been used successfully to carry out product 
developments and support more effectively.  One of the challenges of collaborative PLM 
is providing structure to techniques capable of assisting with organizational goals.  Table 
3 is a list of just a few of the processes that have been implemented by organizations 
through a collaborative PLM system. 
 
Table 3.  Representative Processes Incorporated into PLM 


























5. Integrating Modern Components, Applications, Systems 
Collaborative PLM is a new concept that relies on the capability of several 
complex technologies.  Collaborative PLM is not a new tool, nor does it strive to replace 
the tools you already have.  Collaborative PLM is an effort to take those concepts and 
technologies that have existed on their own, and integrate them together, providing a 
comprehensive understanding of the product.  The manner in which these tools and 
technologies are integrated allows productivity gains that could not be experienced if you 
were running all of the same tools independently.  One of the challenges of PLM is to 
identify system components that are aligned with company goals and understand how 
they fit into a collaborative PLM system.  We will explore four of the foundational 
components of a collaborative PLM system: computer-aided design (CAD), engineering 
data management (EDM), product data management (PDM), and computer-integrated 
manufacturing (CIM).     
a. Computer-Aided Design  
Computer-aided design (CAD) refers to an application that can represent 
physical products using math-based descriptions to locate and consistently replicate 
shapes in either two or three dimensions (Figure 5).  CAD models have the ability to 
improve quality and reduce developmental time and costs.  Precision is only limited by 
the capabilities of the CAD application. Each replication will be identical every time, and 
measurements will be consistent, regardless of who is taking the measurements.  Because 
the object can be rotated and displayed from various angles and zoomed in to see details, 
users can find errors more quickly and can correct them immediately.  
The progression from two-dimensional to three-dimensional drawing 
makes virtuality and computer-aided engineering (CAE) possible.  CAE refers to the 
extract data from the model and performs analyses and simulations, testing things like 
structural integrity and performance.  Simulation delivers insight into the performance of 
a system’s product of process before it has been built.  Once the model is developed, it 
can be inserted into an artificial environment to analyze a system’s behavior under 
various conditions.  From this analysis, errors can be corrected, tradeoffs can be 
evaluated, and designs can be optimized.  Simulation allows a continuous stream of 
“what ifs” to be considered, without the costs and time needed to build physical 
prototypes.   
 
 
Figure 5.  3D Solid Versus Wireframe CAD Model 
(From General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
Once built, the component can be reused throughout the design without having to be 
recreated.  Once released, other products can reuse, update, or modify it to fit future 
needs.  Stakeholders can evaluate the model and accept or suggest modifications, 
improving the design without waiting for a prototype.   
b. Engineering Data Management  
The models built in CAD applications describe the products geometrically, 
but for a complete description, they must be augmented by other information or 
characteristics.  These characteristics, to complete the description, could be any kind of 
information, such as tolerances, tensile strength, weight restrictions, adhesives, 
conductivity requirements, the process for assembly, the methodology for coating or 
painting, or testing requirements or procedures, to name a few (Grieves, 2006). 
This type of information was the focus behind developing engineering 
data management (EDM).  A positive aspect is that there is one program that is used by 
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the majority of engineers to track this information; thus, distribution and access is easier. 
A negative aspect is that this program is Microsoft Excel, which has an infinite number of 
ways it can be customized and presented.  While this flexibility has allowed engineers to 
personalize their files for optimal personal productivity, organizational productivity 
suffers because each new user has to go through a learning curve every time a new file is 
used.  Extensive reorganization needs to occur, taking the extensive data known by 
individuals and making it accessible to the entire organization.   
c. Product Data Management  
Product data management (PDM) is a primary component of a 
collaborative PLM solution and is designed to provide the right information, at the right 
time, to the right person.  PDM is needed as a means to organize and catalog the CAD 
and EDM information.  Once the data is in the systems, it can be accessed by anyone 
with the appropriate permission, anytime and anywhere.  Data does not get lost, and it 
will not be damaged. The data in the systems will not be an outdated copy, and it will not 
be unavailable because someone else has it.  Once all the data is linked, if a source 
document changes, notifications will be made to all those affected so that everyone and 
everything stay on the same page.  Product data is a strategic resource that influences 
decisions. Therefore, the data must be under control, before the product can be 
controlled.     
The functionality of a PDM system can be grouped into two categories: 
user functions and utility functions.  The user functions provide the functionality for the 
users to interact with the database and can be grouped in the following subcategories:  
1. Data vault and document management, 
2. Workflow and process management,  
3. Product structure management, 
4. Classification management, and 
5. Program management (Crnkovic, Dahlqvist, & Asklund, 2003). 
The utility functions provide the ability for the data to interface between 
different operating environments and can be grouped into the following subcategories: 
1. Communication and notification, 
2. Data transport and translation, 
 24
3. Image services, 
4. Administration, and 
5. Application integration (Crnkovic et al., 2003).   
d. Computer-Integrated Manufacturing  
Computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) is the idea that CAD files can be 
used to generate programs to control and sequence automated manufacturing machines.  
Computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) goes a step further, and focuses on the 
advantages of sharing information across function areas of an organization.  CIM 
represents the idea that a computer system could integrate the functions necessary to 
design, engineer, and manufacture a product. 
Rapid prototyping is the construction of a physical prototype directly from 
the computer model.  A physical prototype can be tested to validate the accuracy of the 
computer models, check interference, and evaluate ease of assembly and maintenance.  In 
the traditional prototyping process, a design is produced and then sent to manufacturing 
engineers, who then figure out how to build it.  The manufacturing department has often 
had to recreate data that was available in engineering, but was never transferred so that it 
could modify the design into something buildable.  After this process of recreating data, a 
model was built.  With rapid prototyping, the physical model can be produced directly by 
one of the rapid-prototyping applications, saving time and possible transcription errors or 
misinterpretations from engineering to manufacturing.  Closing the information loop 
between engineering and manufacturing will help correct one of the most inefficient 
elements of engineering, the fact that often, a design is “thrown over the wall” to where 
manufacturing has to figure out if and how to build it.  
6. Collaborative PLM Continuously Strives to Increase Value, Quality, 
 and Reduce Cycle-Time and Costs 
The organization must be structured in a manner that focuses on always providing 
its customers with products and services that satisfy their needs.  By eliminating defects 
and reducing waste first-time quality can be achieved.   
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Cycle-time reduction should be a major focus.  The product was created to satisfy 
a capability gap of the warfighter; thus, the sooner that gap is closed the better.  In 
addition, the sooner the product is in use, the sooner feedback can be applied to a new 
and improved version.  When it comes to rapidly evolving technology, if the cycle-time is 
too long, what began in the design process as cutting edge could be obsolete by the time 
it is in operation.  Shorter cycle-time not only ensures the technology gets to the 
warfighter while it is still relevant, but also supports the evolutionary approach in which 
new technology can be inserted into the latest model.  Finally, shorter cycle-times lead to 
increased flexibility and experience for the design organization.  As the threats evolve, 
having a design team that is not invested in designing the weapon for the previous war 
will keep the organization agile.  In a given time period, a shorter cycle-time results in a 
greater number of cycles;  meaning, the more times a team does something, the better 
they will become.        
D. WHAT IS THE NEED FOR PLM? 
This section will look at some of the driving forces behind the need for 
collaborative PLM, and reasons why the previous technologies and procedures are not 
sufficient in the current environment.  The Navy is not alone in its need to improve its 
business model. Indeed the same thing drives other companies: the need to create value 
and improve productivity, the rate of innovation, collaboration, and quality (Grieves, 
2006). 
1. Maximizing Productivity 
Productivity for an organization refers to the ratio of outputs received while 
expending a given set of inputs or resources.  The private sector focuses on striving to 
improve productivity, which it hopes translates into improved profitability. The 
government does not turn a profit, per se, but productivity is still critical because there 
are never enough dollars to fund every need, and the ability for government programs to 
make the best use of the funds available, frees money to allocate to other needs.    
A 1994 Cooper and Lybrand study broke down the typical day of an engineer 
(Figure 6).  The study showed that about 24% of time was spent looking for, distributing, 
or maintaining information.  The engineers also indicated that rather than search for data 
it was easier and quicker to just redo work that had already been completed previously; 
redoing work accounted for 21% of the time.  Another 14% of the time was spent in 
meetings, where engineers were either updating or being updated on progress (Saaksvuori 
& Immonen, 2008).  This study indicated that there is a tremendous opportunity to 
improve the productivity of the typical engineer.   
 
      
Figure 6.  The Engineer’s Use of Time 
(After Saaksvuori & Immonen, 2008) 
 
Collaborative PLM offers the ability to positively impact productivity by 
leveraging information to eliminate wasted time, especially the time spent searching for 
data, by utilizing simulations to discover the most efficient workflow, and by facilitating 
the reuse of designs that would normally be recreated.     
2. Cultivate Innovation  
Innovation is a change in the thought-process for doing something. It may refer to 
incremental, emergent, or radical and revolutionary changes in thinking, products, 
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processes, or organizations.  These changes could be new inventions, such as the 
automobile or computer, or they could be new approaches, such as the assembly line or 
LEAN manufacturing.  All these examples have changed the way things are 
accomplished in their respective disciplines. When Michael Grieves delineated the 
different goals of productivity and innovation, his position is that while productivity 
focuses on costs, innovation focuses on adding value for the stakeholder.  Taking his 
point about integration further, he asserted that innovation is another major driver behind 
collaborative PLM, one that can be subdivided into (1) product innovation and (2) 
workflow innovation (Grieves, 2006).     
The first kind of innovation, i.e., product innovation, refers to improving some 
characteristic of the product, such as new technology or new features.  These things 
create value for the users by reducing the time, energy, and materials required to perform 
tasks or by making it possible to perform tasks that were previously impossible.  An 
example of product innovation would be the USS Nautilus (SSN 571) the first nuclear 
submarine, which could remain submerged for up to four months, a feat previously 
unachievable, this capability made new missions possible and transformed the submarine 
force (Smithsonian Institution, n.d.).  Collaborative PLM cannot deliver any new 
innovative ideas but can free engineers from menial tasks and allow them to focus 
innovation.  Through collaboration with the stakeholders, PLM helps raise visibility of 
what the customer values in order to limit product innovation to only the value-added 
items.  The users will determine what is a desire and what is a need to help guide the 
design effort.  For instance, if the Navy “needs” a ship that can go 35 knots, it may not be 
willing to pay the extra cost to design a ship that can go 50 knots.  By failing to listen to 
the customer, there is a risk of expending resources on non value-added features. 
The actual task of innovation does not occur without human skill, talent, and 
creativity.  The collaborative PLM’s role is to enhance this effort by ensuring the right 
information is accessible when and where it is needed.  Innovation also requires 




through activities such as eliminating redundant activities or decreasing time searching 
for information will help ensure that more resources are available to focus on value-
added innovation tasks. 
Workflow innovation is the second kind of innovation, and unlike product 
innovation, it focuses on finding better methods and technologies to reduce the time, 
energy, and material needed to produce the product.  For instance, Henry Ford created the 
assembly line to build his automobiles.  As a result, his more effective methods created 
savings, making automobiles much more affordable; this not only changed how 
automobiles were constructed but also influenced the processes of many other industries.  
The majority of the recommendations contained in this research deal with workflow 
innovation.  This approach was chosen because an improved workflow has the ability to 
improve the entire portfolio of programs, while product innovation is more specific to a 
particular capability.  We will be searching for workflow innovation that the Navy can 
apply to ensure that the most efficient use of resources is being made.                
3. Improve Collaboration 
Collaboration is where two or more people or organizations work together in an 
intersection of common goals.  For example, an intellectual endeavor is collaborative and 
creative in nature when numerous people share knowledge, learning, and build 
consensus.  As project teams today are rarely located under one roof, the need to 
effectively collaborate must be enabled by technologies that connect people across 
geographical distances, organizational borders, and, more frequently, national borders.  
The collaborative PLM contribution to collaboration is the ability to colocate in virtual 
time and space, people who otherwise would not be able to be together geographically or 
temporally.  
Social networking is a form of collaboration adding new dimensions to the way 
that people interact within their network of friends.  The latest versions of collaborative 
PLM have embraced these social computing capabilities to take advantage of these 
collaborative techniques, creating “corporate social networks” that tie together 
communities around a common business goal (Brown J., 2009).   
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Features such as instant communication and sharing—including alerts, 
subscriptions, instant messaging, status updates, and other techniques—help people 
instantly contribute to the ongoing product development dialogue. Chat and presence 
detection help bring communities together in real-time to share ideas and solve problems, 
answering questions that would otherwise be saved for later, forgotten, or ignored. This is 
particularly important during the early phases of a project when interactions are more 
frequent and results are less formal.    
These new social capabilities go beyond traditional collaboration, which generally 
occurs between people who already know each other.  These social capabilities build on 
what is referred to as social discovery. Social discovery involves finding others in the 
corporate network that may have relevant expertise, similar to how the Internet-based 
popular network Facebook recommends friends.  Through the network, colleagues who 
may never have met may contact each other, and can build upon their collective 
knowledge base.  Corporate social networking is a new feature of collaborative PLM 
applications, and based on how it matures, has potential to facilitate innovation and help 
enhance collaboration (Brown J., 2009). 
The USS Virginia program used teleconferencing (Figure 7) to have long-distance 
reviews/discussions of the evolving Virginia Class design on a regular basis. The 
teleconferencing system used in the program allows reviewers at a distance and in real 
time to see engineering models of the design, including the 3D virtual reality model of 
the ship arrangement.  During sessions, the Navy participants in Washington, DC, were 
able to request changes in the 3D model (being executed in Connecticut), question the 
location of certain items, and see how certain items could be removed and accessed 
(General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002).  As this example shows, the ultimate end state 
of collaborative PLM is to be capable of capturing enough data about a product that the 
virtual product is indistinguishable from the physical, and the richness of communication 
makes virtual communication just as effective as face-to-face contact.   
  
Figure 7. Virtual Collaboration on USS Virginia During Weekly Teleconference 
(From General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
4. Need to Develop Quality 
There exist two main aspects of quality: first, the product must meet its 
specifications; second, the product must perform to a particular standard of usage 
(Grieves, 2006).  A product that lacks quality will at best result in wasted time, material, 
and require energy to repair it, and at worst, it could cause injury or death.   
Products that fail to meet their specifications must be scrapped, reworked, or 
repaired, consuming resources that could otherwise be applied to value-added activities.  
If the designer or supplier has confusion or misunderstandings concerning the 
specifications, then there is a greater chance that the product will fail to meet the intended 
specifications.  Collaborative PLM offers a constant and singular view of product data to 
help remove any uncertainty about product specification, and, as described before, the 
collaboration allows the building of a consensus while in the virtual world, before any 
physical delays can be experienced.  
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When looking at the complexity of the products being created and realizing that 
the operating environment is equally complex, it is easy to justify extensive testing to 
ensure products can meet usage requirements.  Traditionally, extensive and 
comprehensive testing in various states under various conditions was required, 
consuming excessive resources.  Collaborative PLM can assist by conducting a majority 
of tests in the virtual world for substantially less time and money, and because a physical 
prototype is not required, collaborative PLM can test many more options than physical 
testing (Grieves, 2006).  Dassault Systems collaborative PLM system V6 has the ability 
to conduct virtual maintenance (Figure 8).  This feature not only measures the 
ergonomics of the workers, in order to verify the task can be accomplished safely, but 
also enables the worker to see everything that needs to be seen, and shows that all tasks 
are physically possible (Dassault Systems, 2010).  This is an example of how problems 
can be identified and corrected in the virtual world, where the impact to the program is 
negligible.    
 
Figure 8. Images Demonstrating Virtual Maintenance  
(From Dassault Systems, 2010) 
 
5. Current Life Cycle Environment Lacks Control 
An aspect of properly managing product data in the product-lifecycle environment 
means not allowing the data collected to sit in a virtual file cabinet and become a giant 
repository, collecting dust without providing any benefits.  The data being created, 
collected, integrated, and used during a program, and made available in a virtual library 
could be as follows: customer requirements, design specifications, process models, 




fixture designs, mounting instructions, process plans, bills of material, configuration 
drawings, CAD geometry, status reports, maintenance history, and requirements, to name 
a few.   
A potential problem with managing the different types of product data is the large 
number of people who use product data through the lifecycle, including members of 
various departments inside an organization, suppliers, contractors, maintainers, users, and 
so on.  Each needs access to the data to support the product; however, at the same time, 
the data also needs to be protected from those who should not have access.  As the 
repository of product data grows, so can wasted efforts; developers may waste time 
searching through various databases, having to navigate through the mass of existing 
designs to find a specific piece of data.  Studies have shown that design engineers spend 
up to 80% of their time on administrative and information-retrieval activities (Stark, 
2005).  If the data found is an outdated version, rework could be required to correct 
discrepancies.  When the existing design cannot be found, the data is usually recreated, 
resulting in unnecessary costs.       
As more and more data is generated, the task of controlling it becomes more 
overwhelming.  CAD drawings are just one piece from the list of product-data types 
mentioned previously. A submarine’s plans can easily exceed 100,000 drawings (Stark, 
2005). Think of a single CAD drawing as one piece of a 100,000 piece puzzle: as the 
designer completes the drawing, it is stored in the project data base with all the other 
drawings, simply thrown into the box of puzzle pieces.  What happens if a particular 
piece is needed later?  How long could it take to sort through the box to find the 
particular piece?  When the file is needed and cannot be found, it must be recreated, 
usually in a rush, and will likely be less thorough than the original, opening the potential 
for more errors.  Just because the particular file could not be found before making the 
decision to recreate it does not mean that it is not actually in the system.  And now, the 
puzzle has two of the same pieces, causing problems later.  Each time this cycle repeats, 
another version of a file enters the system, and the likelihood that work will be 
progressed based on data from an out-of-date document is increased.   This cycle is how 
the lack of reliable configuration management introduces more errors and waste.  
 
Figure 9.  Enhanced 3D Product Model 
(From Siemens PLM Software (Team Center), 2008) 
 
Collaborative PLM addresses this issue by having integrated all the product data.  
For instance, through the 3D model (Figure 9), a user can click on a particular component 
and the data fields will show every piece of product data associated with that component.  
Additionally, with the appropriate links established, if that part changes, the stakeholders 
of other affected components are notified. For example, if one of the puzzle pieces is 
changed, the owners of the surrounding puzzle pieces will be notified in case their pieces 
must also be changed.  This prevents problems that may otherwise go unnoticed until 
much later in the process.   
E. BENEFITS ALONG THE LIFECYCLE 
Organizations are often metrics based, and prior to making a major shift in 
strategy, the metrics must justify the value of that shift.  This has justified program 
managers in making decisions that affect today’s bottom line, while disregarding the 
effect on the lifecycle. Collaborative PLM will make the full impact of these decisions 
visible sooner to correct this behavior.  When decisions are made that consider the entire 
lifecycle, sometimes the benefits are not easily traced back to a particular decision, and 
sometimes they will not occur in the same phase. They will often overlap or appear in 
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different forms (i.e., cost, schedule, or functionality). However, when the product is 
under control, there will be benefits. The following chapters will introduce case studies 
and specific examples of how the DoD portfolio could benefit by modifying its processes, 
to correct deficiencies and take full advantage of capabilities possible with a collaborative 
PLM suite.  The following is a list compiled by Softech and John Stark (2007) of 
potential benefits with collaborative PLM: 
 Capturing customer requirements better, 
 Creating more innovative products, 
 Delivering the required product on schedule, on budget, 
 Providing superb support of the product in use, 
 Preventing future failures through knowledge of past failures, 
 Schedule maintenance effectively based on knowledge of the actual use of 
the product,  
 Reducing over-engineered products based on actual use of products, 
 Reducing labor costs by reducing time spent on data retrieval and 
management, leaving more time for value-added activities, 
 Reducing overhead labor by reducing paper shuffling, data re-entry, and 
data formatting, and 
 Reducing engineering cost by reusing designs. (Softech INC and John 
Stark Associates, 2007) 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
CIMdata Corporation stated: “PLM is not just a technology, but is an approach in 
which processes are as important, or more important, than data” (Vasilash, n.d.). 
According to CIMdata, PLM goes beyond data. It is “a business approach to solving the 
problem of managing the complete set of product definition information—creating that 
information, managing it through its life, and disseminating and using it throughout the 
lifecycle of the product.” In other words, in order to effectively make decisions from the 
lifecycle perspective, the data must be properly managed; however, managing the data 
properly does not indicate that all decisions are being made with the lifecycle in mind 
(Vasilash, n.d.). 
Michael Bauer, the executive director of North American Automotive, gave an 
interview in which he stressed that collaborative PLM is only a tool designed to act as a 
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process multiplier, giving benefits to those with good processes while giving those with 
bad processes the knowledge to catch up.  He said:  
Too often we run into companies that are trying to use technology for 
competitive advantage, but it is really the process that makes the 
difference.  If you have best practices in your organization, then PLM can 
help amplify the results. If you don't have best practices in your 
organization, then PLM—at least the newly developed PLM products that 
encompass the learning from a multitude companies—can help you get 
much further ahead than you are. (Vasilash, n.d.) 
Collaborative PLM has an impact on all the functional areas of a company: 
design, engineering, manufacturing, sales, operation, and service.  Collaborative PLM is 
the next generation of LEAN thinking, in that it actively substitutes information for 
wasted time, material, and energy.  This information helps designers reduce the time 
spent designing items that already exist, and instead it allows them to apply time to 
innovation or improvements to make the product better.  People can spend time 
researching ways to improve the process, and increase efficiency and productivity, by 
figuring out ways to use less material or create products that are more easily produced.   
It is possible to design, validate, and test products entirely in the virtual space. 
This not only creates better products, but also provides confidence that the products will 
perform at the level expected by the customer.  Products that can exceed the expectation 
of the customer are the real definition and test of quality.  
The investment into collaborative PLM is not insignificant.  For the Navy to 
acquire software, hardware, consulting, education and training, the cost could easily 
surpass several hundred million dollars.  However, the collaborative PLM providers 
foresaw this financial barrier, and the architecture they created helps overcome this 
hurdle.  Collaborative PLM can be phased in on a project-by-project basis. As we will see 
later, there are already several Navy acquisition programs using collaborative PLM 
software.  Collaborative PLM is a conglomeration of services that build upon each other, 
producing benefits greater than the individual contributions.  Another element of the 
architecture is the ability to unbundle any of these features, either to stagger the capital 
investment or to tailor the functionality to the organization or project's particular needs.   
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With as much as 80% of the costs set early in design, it is logical that the majority 
of the benefits of collaborative PLM would be delivered as information and decision-
making would be improved during this stage.  However, one of the biggest benefits is 
when collaborative PLM initiatives cross functional boundaries and maintain the 
organization’s focus on the total lifecycle.  The author hopes that this chapter has 
demonstrated how collaborative PLM can help an organization think LEAN and decrease 
the costs of wasted time, energy, and material. However, collaborative PLM is not 
limited to only a cost-reduction strategy, for it can also lead to increasing complexity, 
decreasing cycle-times, aiding collaboration, improving innovation, and therefore quality.  
In essence, it can ensure that the product is under control, having an impact on all aspects 
of an organization. 
Before moving on, it should be reiterated that the benefits outlined in this chapter 
would not be realized simply because a new system is bought and installed.  A 
collaborative PLM suite contains some very useful tools to assist with problems in 
product information and lifecycle management.  However, a technological solution rarely 
solves any problems itself. Collaborative PLM can assist with the organizational changes 
that are needed for the acquisition community to gain control over its products.  The 
following chapters will look at lessons that the DoD can learn from successful 
organizations, as well as how those improvements will be facilitated by the capabilities of 
a collaborative PLM suite.                    
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IV. LEAN PRODUCT DESIGN  
We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking that we used 
when we created them. 
— Albert Einstein 
The preceding chapter introduced collaborative PLM as technology designed to 
provide structure and efficiency to an organization, as it records, retains, and organizes 
knowledge throughout the lifecycle.  This chapter will discuss how to use this knowledge 
set to make more informed decisions, which should lead to correcting the inefficient, 
wasteful processes that have led to the unsustainable cost growth, schedule delays, and 
unacceptably high TOC that have historically plagued the DoD acquisition programs.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The essence of the LEAN philosophy is rather simplistic: It is the pursuit of the 
perfect product, through the elimination of all waste, while adding value as defined by the 
needs of the customer.  The majority of the research and applications of LEAN 
principles, attempting to eliminate waste or non value-added tasks, has focused on 
production and manufacturing processes, overlooking the potential benefits during the 
design process (Spear, 2004).   
There are differences between manufacturing and design techniques, which means 
that the same techniques can’t be directly applied to both processes.  Manufacturing 
processes are usually serial and visible, making it easier for a person examining the 
processes to identify and remove waste. However, the design process is usually not serial, 
and waste is much harder to eliminate, because it may not appear until much later in the 
process.  For instance, if two different systems call for a valve to be installed in the same 
physical location, the mistake might go unnoticed until construction, when the problem 
becomes visually apparent.   
The version of LEAN product design presented in this research was developed by 
Bart Huthwaite, Sr., the founder of the Huthwaite Innovation Institute and the thought 
leader in the emerging business process known as “Systematic Corporate Innovation.” 
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This is a method for giving managers the knowledge to make corporate innovation 
understandable, repeatable, and very importantly, measurable.  Huthwaite has mentored 
managers and teams in corporate innovation worldwide at more than 1000 companies 
over the past 30 years.   Huthwaite used the following analogy to get to the heart of the 
issue: “What is needed is more fire prevention and less firefighting” (Huthwaite, n.d. a, 
p.1 ).  Huthwaite described that just as firefighters are portrayed as heroes on the front 
pages of newspapers, organizations have their own heroes, who are constantly called 
upon to put out fires and save the company or project.  Underappreciated is the fire 
inspector who saves far more homes by ensuring that a fire never breaks out in the first 
place and accomplishes this feat for a fraction of what it cost to put out the fire.  The LPD 
is the fire inspector in his analogy.  Huthwaite's philosophy is essentially the principle 
that a more productive way to eliminate the waste in the process is to ensure that it will 
not happen in the first place. 
B. WHAT IS LEAN PRODUCT DESIGN? 
Huthwaite would answer the question “What is Lean Product Design?” by saying 
“it is a verb and a noun.”  As a noun, it is a product that has been created to deliver high 
value with low waste.  As a verb, it describes the design process to create such a product 
(Huthwaite, 2007a).  The method presented in this paper goes beyond the traditional 
approach of elimination of the production waste on the factory floor by extending the 
efforts to the eliminating waste experienced by the supplier and customer as well.  
Another reason for this methods section is the comprehensive approach to balancing the 
need for waste reduction and value addition across the entire lifecycle.  This particular 
application of LEAN design also pairs nicely with the capabilities of a collaborative PLM 
suite, and its goal of integrating knowledge across all domains of the lifecycle.       
Huthwaite evolved the following LEAN Design Equation while working with 
hundreds of design teams as a consultant (Huthwaite, 2007a). 
Strategic Ilities - Evil Ings = LEAN Product Success 
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Huthwaite defines the strategic “Ilities” as the values and attributes that both the 
producing organization as well as the ones customers seek from a product such as 
“manufacturab-ility,” “maintainab-ility,” “durabil-ity,” and so on.  The evil “Ings” are the 
processes or tasks that create the potential for quality loss, high costs, and slow time to 
market.  The term describes no-value processes such as “inspect-ing,” “fix-ing,” “repair-
ing,” and other non-productive tasks throughout the lifecycle (Huthwaite, 2007b, p. 139).  
The LEAN approach helps design teams find a design solution that maintains a balance 
between values as opposed to trying to maximize one at the expense of all others.  For 
example, the LEAN approach would prevent the design of the most technically capable 
ship ever created only to discover all that technology made it unaffordable.  Instead, the 
LEAN philosophy finds a balance between all the customer values; using this big picture 
approach produces an optimal solution.  
C. “LAWS” OF LEAN DESIGN 
The following section will discuss four of the five factors Bart Huthwaite calls his 
“laws” of LEAN design.  An additional law, the law of marketplace pull, would be 
relevant to the requirement generation process, but it is outside the scope of this research 
and as a result was eliminated.  Huthwaite described his laws as “the most direct route to 
product value and simplicity, giving you the ‘true north’ of what LPD is all about.  They 
will guide you so the ‘how to’ of making LEAN design will really work for you” 
(Huthwaite, n.d. b, p. 43). 
1. Law of Strategic Value 
Projects are initiated to satisfy particular primary values of customers, and are 
balanced against values held by an organization.  These values are the guiding principles 
used to develop the requirements.  Understanding the customer values will help designers 
understand the “why” that is driving a particular requirement and will lead to a more 
complete design.   
Actively managing the product across all four of the lifecycle domains (design, 
supply, manufacturing, and customer) will result in a better understanding of what the 
product needs to be.  To help design teams, Mr. Huthwaite has developed a list of 
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questions that help designers identify stakeholders’ strategic values (Table 4). He stressed 
that “good designs always begin with problem seeking not problem solving” (Huthwaite, 
2007a, p. 64).   
 
Table 4.  Customer and Company Primary Values 






















By “problem seeking” and exploring each of the values found in Table 4 with the 
stakeholders, the designers will understand the priorities and what the stakeholders want 
from the product.  Each of these value categories has opportunities for the program to 
conduct tradeoffs, to create the optimal design solution for the particular stakeholder.  For 
instance, when designing the Virginia (SSN 774) class submarine, the Navy valued 
affordability above all other attributes except stealth.  During each trade, the deciding 
factor was affordability unless it dealt with stealth (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 
2002). Thus, without understanding what the customer values, the design team will be 
unable to deliver an optimal solution.   
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2. Law of Waste Prevention 
In Huthwaite’s model of LEAN Product Development, every decision made 
should be to either enhance one of the values discussed in the previous section or to 
minimize the potential for waste.  The seven types of waste identified in Table 5 are 
responsible for the majority of waste found in programs (Huthwaite, 2007a).  A general 
rule is the sooner waste is identified, the cheaper it will be to resolve.  Once the concept 
becomes a prototype, or takes root in the mind of your team members, the flexibility and 
receptivity to change shrinks drastically (Huthwaite, 2007b).  
 
Table 5.  Product Life Cycle Waste 



















3. Law of Innovation Flow 
“There is always a way to do it better . . . find it!” —Thomas Edison 
According to Huthwaite (2007a), The Law of Innovation Flow states, “we must 
provide the means for all members of the design team to contribute to the innovation 
process.  Only by seeing the design challenge from many different perspectives will we 
ever be able to solve it” (p. 87).   
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Developing a good design requires systematically working through the design 
space, exploring all possibilities prior to selecting a particular solution.  In The Lean 
Design Solution, Huthwaite recommends that design teams should work the problem 
from the system, through the subsystems, down to the parts levels, looking to capitalize 
on the five targets of opportunity: functions, parts, processes, materials, and people 
(Huthwaite, 2007a, p. 99).  Ship designers have an endless set of opportunities to improve 
the design. When looking at functions, the idea for interchangeable mission modules on 
LCS was created. By analyzing unique part counts, a common parts catalog was 
identified as a way to reduce the strain on the logistics system. Through examining 
processes, the question was raised of why ships cannot be built upside down to make it 
easier on the welders. Scrutinizing the use of materials led to aluminum superstructures, 
replacing steel, saving weight and painting costs.  Focusing on reducing personnel cost 
and improving safety led to the idea that watch standers could be removed as systems 
were automated and capable of being controlled remotely.  The first design is never the 
best, and the second and third are only a step in the journey to success (Huthwaite, 2007a, 
p. 99). 
Collaborative PLM applications offer the designer a powerful tool, the ability to 
store and organize data so no idea has to be thrown away.  Every attempt to solve a 
particular problem has merit, a good idea could be iterated to become great, a failure 
today could be tomorrow’s answer, a dead end may serve as a warning not to repeat the 
same mistakes (Huthwaite, 2007b). 
4. Law of Fast Feedback 
Metrics provide a sense of direction to a program. That direction, be it right or 
wrong, depends on the quality of the metric.  DoD programs rely on earned-value metrics 
and status reports to measure a program’s health. Earned Value Management (EVM) is a 
method for integrating the scope, schedule, and resources for measuring project 
performance. It compares the amount of work or effort that was planned with what was 
actually earned and spent to determine if cost and schedule performance were as planned. 
A limitation of these metrics is that they only indicate when a problem already exists.  
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During the 2010 NPS Defense Acquisition Symposium, an analogy compared the 
limitation of these metrics to driving your car by only looking at the rear-view mirror.  
No matter how successful metrics and testing are at uncovering waste, a better strategy is 
to look out the windshield and ensure that waste was never there to begin with.  Being 
over budget or behind schedule is only a symptom of a problem. To address the root 
cause, additional research must be conducted.  Because earned value is not a real-time 
metric, by the time the issue is actually resolved, a program may have been traveling in 
the wrong direction for some time.      
Earned-value measurements are still valuable and need to be maintained. They 
fall into a category of metrics called “performance metrics” (M. Brown, 2006).  A 
performance metric lets you know if you are tracking toward your goal and if corrective 
action is needed.  A second category called “predictive metrics” is potentially more 
valuable to managers (M. Brown, 2006).  These metrics will tell us the likelihood that our 
decisions will have the desired results.  Huthwaite (2007a) recommended using predictive 
metrics to achieve three important benefits: 
1. By providing focus and direction, they help ensure all stakeholders’ visions 
for product goals are aligned.   
2. They provide a better understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship 
between design actions and results, providing decision-makers the knowledge 
needed to make good decisions.   
3. Once you have buy in on the vision, implementation becomes easier. 
Predictive metrics are developed looking towards the end state. (p.106 ) 
Over his years of consulting experience, Huthwaite identified seven rules quoted 
as follows, which he contended would make for effective measurement and feedback 
(Huthwaite, 2007a, pp. 107–111).  
“Rule one: Measure what is most important to your customers, not just what is 
easiest to measure.”  A project may be on schedule, under budget, and meet all of the 
technical-performance metrics, but if it fails to deliver on the customer values, it cannot 
be considered a success.  Finding an accurate metric to forecast designs TOC is very 
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difficult, but if designs cannot be evaluated based on this metric operation and 
sustainment, costs might eventually exceed the budget.       
“Rule two: Be cautious with metrics, as the wrong metric can lead to the wrong 
conclusion.”  For instance, DoD program managers have measured and been held 
accountable for the acquisition cost of their programs.  Is it wise to trade one dollar of 
savings during acquisition for ten dollars during sustainment?  Acquisition costs could be 
the wrong metric for determining program success.   
“Rule three: Use both hard and soft metrics.”  In his book, Keeping Score: Using 
the Right Metrics to Drive World Class Performance, Mark Brown emphasized the 
importance of soft metrics: “Soft measures are measures of customer opinions, 
perceptions and feelings.  These are leading edge indicators that should be used to try and 
predict customer behavior.  The opinions and feelings of customers are extremely 
important” (M. Brown, 2006, p. 116).  For instance, measuring how many targets a new 
radar can track and engage simultaneously is an important metric and should be recorded.  
The human operator must also be able to interact with the new radar, and the evaluation 
must ask: “Has the operator's satisfaction been measured?”  Virtual reality tools such as 
computer automated virtual environment (CAVE) have been designed to allow sailors to 
walk around inside and interact with a design years before it becomes a reality (Briggs et 
al., 2009).  As those tools are integrated into the collaborative PLM suite, the feeling and 
observations concerning the design can be embedded in the model, giving designers 
another form of feedback.  However important soft metrics are, they should be 
supplemented by hard measures of customer satisfaction to track what the customer 
actually does.   
“Rule four: Measure for direction first and precision later.”  During the very early 
stages of design—for instance, when the design team is looking at concepts for hull 
design—there are no hydrostatic details to be measured with any degree of accuracy.  To 
compensate for the lack of specifics, consensus measurements such as Delphi can capture 
experts’ gut feelings, and this type of measurement will let designers know if they are on 
the right track. Precision can be worked out later, once a project is heading in the right 
direction.   
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“Rule five: Get information concurrently on the “ilities,” or the values and 
attributes that both the producing organization as well as the customer seek from a 
product, and the “ings,” or processes or tasks that create the potential for quality loss, and 
high costs.”  Many DoD programs focus on one area at a time, and lose sight of the total 
picture.  Section D will show how radar charts can be used to capture the entire design 
solution.   
“Rule six: Make sure everyone is on the same feedback system.”  The 
measurement creation process helps form consensus on what problems must be solved 
and how they will be evaluated.  It is hard to win, if everyone is playing by different 
rules.   
Finally, “rule seven: Enable those who will be measured to have input into the 
creation of the measurement system.”  Ownership is a powerful way to assure a feedback 
system will be used.         
Collaborative PLM has capabilities that compliment each of these seven rules and 
can assist in the development of an appropriate set of metrics.  As the design is 
progressing, collaborative PLM can store various data points.  After enough data is 
captured, statistical analysis can reveal which of the captured data points correlate to the 
factor that dictates success or failure.  For example, a collaborative PLM analysis might 
show schedule delays are related to design stability, which can be measured, by the 
number of change orders, and the number of change orders is correlated to the percentage 
of drawings complete by a particular milestone.   
D. LEAN DESIGN SCORECARDS 
Measure the right things and get the right results. Measure the wrong 
things and get the wrong results. —Proverb (Huthwaite, 2007a) 
Several previous sections have discussed the value of metrics and called for the 
development of more predictive metrics to ensure that programs are heading in the right 
direction.  This section is going to describe one process that can help create these 
predictive metrics.     
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According to Product Development for the LEAN Enterprise, some of Toyota’s 
success was attributed to its knowledge-based product design.  This approach encourages 
sharing and applying collective knowledge to improve the probability of product 
development success (Kennedy, 2003).  The following method is a technique to capture 
knowledge and assess the leanness of the total design solution.  This example comes from 
Bart Huthwaite’s book The Lean Design Solution, in which he stresses that the greatest 
value comes from working with the stakeholders to develop the criteria for how the 
program will be evaluated, where the byproduct of that process is referred to as the 
scorecard.  This process is valuable, as it forces communication between stakeholders, 
gives the design team insight into stakeholder priorities and encourages the exploration of 
many different solutions across the entire lifecycle (Huthwaite, 2007a). 
 The best way to develop project scorecards is through a dialogue between the 
stakeholders and the design team.  The process begins by asking the stakeholder to 
develop criteria for the rating scale (Table 6), making sure to capture the rationale by 
asking “why.”   
Table 6.  Example of Scorecard Rating Scale  








Once consensus between the design team and key stakeholders is reached 
concerning scale, the baseline is scored along with any alternatives that need to be 
compared (Figure 10). Once again, it is important to capture the “why” behind each 
rating; this will give true insight to the values behind the decisions.  For instance, when 
evaluating two designs based on maximum speed, a faster ship will be more desirable 
because it offers operational flexibility.  However, knowing how much speed is enough is 
important for the designers, as a ship may be able to go 30 knots on 4 engines, but to 
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reach 35 knots it would need 6.  Those additional 5 knots have a cost associated with 
them: either it could be money for the additional engines, or it could be removing 2 
missiles to decrease the weight.  Understanding the values attributed by the stakeholders 
will be important for the design team to deliver an optimized solution.  These scorecards 
must be created for each phase of the lifecycle to fully understand the impact of the 
design.  Recall the car design built to optimize manufacturing with dire repercussions to 
maintenance: Complexity in manufacturing may result in simplicity for the user.  Unless 
both of these environments are explored, it is impossible to make informed tradeoffs.  
Scorecards can also be applied at all levels of the design from the component, to sub-
system, to system, to system of systems.  This technique is an effective way to share 
high-level information and knowledge among those involved in the process, ensuring 
alignment to the strategic goals and facilitating quick management reviews.        
  
Figure 10.  Examples of Value and Waste Scorecards 
(After Huthwaite, 2007a) 
E. ACHIEVING LEAN DESIGN WITH COLLABORATIVE PLM 
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Collaborative PLM was created to manage a product and its associated data 
throughout the lifecycle, from the cradle to the grave.  So to speak, LEAN is a strategy to 
remove waste throughout processes, saving the resources expended on wasteful activities, 
in order to ideally use them more profitably.  The data collected and organized inside the 
collaborative PLM environment will be used to accomplish the LEAN analysis to identify 
wasteful processes.  Studies have documented cases in which applying LEAN principles 
to product development has reduced product development cycle-times by 60-70% (Fiore, 
2004).  Once the more efficient process is identified, collaborative PLM has the 
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capability to automate the workflow and institutionalize the efficient process, making 
both data and processes accessible to users throughout the lifecycle to eliminate 
repetition, redundancy, errors, and other forms of waste.   
Peter Schmitt, vice president of marketing communications for Dassault System 
in the Americas, explained:  
If you drive the concepts and principles of LEAN up the chain of product 
development, you're coming to manufacturing planning, and from there to 
the product design. The further up the product lifecycle, the bigger the 
benefits you get.  It's that old saw: A mistake detected in design costs $1; 
in manufacturing planning, $100; in production, $1,000. (Gould, n.d., 
para. 4)  
To show how collaborative PLM can facilitate LEAN, I will dissect the following 
explanation by David Van Horn, director of Archstone Consulting:  
LEAN is all about designing and developing products that meet or exceed 
customer needs, that can be effectively and efficiently produced and 
serviced, and that do not involve excessive development investment. . . . 
LEAN “works on” physical product and information flow, while LPD 
“works on” engineering product and information flow–virtual products, if 
you will. (Dassault Systems, 2007, p. 2)  
Van Horn states that products must meet or exceed customer needs. Collaborative 
PLM cannot determine a customer’s needs or wants, but it can store the information 
about market needs and wants so that those qualified to separate the good ideas from the 
bad can access it.  Howie Distel, a solution architect for Dassault Systems, explained, “In 
defining a product that has category killer potential, it is important to eliminate bad 
concepts quickly. The ability to create rapid design candidates and interrogate those 
designs through simulation and validation of virtual product data is at the heart of PLM” 
(Dassault Systems, 2007, p. 2). 
Van Horn also referred to how designing products with manufacturability and 
maintainability requires interactions between the manufacturing and maintenance 
departments early in the design.  He argued that early in the design process, making an 
informed decision is key to program success by citing that “70–80% of the final unit cost 
of a product is driven by research- and development-based decisions, often without 
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conscious awareness of the repercussions of those decisions” (Jaruzelski, Dehoff, & 
Bordia, n.d.).  If a problem does not emerge until after the design is complete and the 
product is in production or operation and sustainment, there may not be enough time or 
resources to go back and fix it.  Collaborative PLM helps produce fast feedback, by 
integrating all parties involved, and allowing each member’s specialized expertise to be 
incorporated.  Helping bring those unconscious decisions to light and manage them with 
processes designed to eliminate waste is a key capability of collaborative PLM.     
Excess development investment should be minimized by collaborative PLM, 
enabling broad visibility into the product data and keeping everyone informed on 
progress, regardless of their role or location.  Allowing everyone to access, create, 
modify, and manage information concurrently from a single source eliminates the 
traditional data silos that lead to errors from working with outdated data.  Powerful 
search capability makes it easier to find existing designs that meet or could be adapted to 
fit the current project needs, eliminating rework and reinvention.  Employing the use of 
relational design templates enables a part to be designed once and automatically adjusted 
to fit new parameters when required.  Using templates to standardize processes will help 
create the consistency that will improve the manufacturability of the product.  These 
examples demonstrate how the structure and workflow can be built inside collaborative 
PLM, reducing resources spent on wasteful activities.      
Collaborative PLM operates with a knowledge-based engineering method that can 
be used to capture corporate know-how and standards and can improve quality and 
consistency across the portfolio of programs.  As Distel stated, “Over time, collaborative 
PLM properly used will become a repository for everything the company knows and 
what they have learned from past projects.  Because you have so much time on the back 
end, collaborative PLM makes it possible to spend more time in the early stages of 
development, investigating design alternatives that lead to new innovations” (Dassault 
Systems, 2007, p. 3). 
Products can be mocked up in a virtual 3D environment to determine if project 
goals will be met.  This can usually be done for lower cost and in less time than building 
a physical model.  These savings can be applied to compare several different alternative 
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designs to determine the clear winner.  Boeing, for example, rolled out the virtual design 
of its new 787 Dreamliner in 2006.  This presentation included a 3D model, virtual 
simulations, video of production start up, and the final assembly production flow.  Being 
able to correct deficiencies in the process while in the virtual environment led to 
efficiencies that allowed the actual first-time assemblies to be constructed in hours, not 
the days originally scheduled.  Those same efficiencies resulted in calculations that show 
that an overall operating cost has been improved an additional 20% from the original 
projections (Gates, 2006). 
These are just a few examples of how collaborative PLM can facilitate the 
application of LEAN best practices during the product-development cycle.  By 
eliminating routine work, streamlining processes, exploring alternatives, supporting 
concurrent design, eliminating data inconsistencies, and improving communication 
between team members, collaborative PLM can lead to an LPD process in which results 
surpass those experienced in the manufacturing sector.      
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V. FRAMEWORK BEHIND DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE 
STATE 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter discusses how the synergy between organizations, people, 
information, technology, processes and practices can create a successful organization. 
This grouping will also be the structure behind how the recommendations are presented 
in the following chapters.     
When first being introduced to collaborative PLM, it is easy to think of it only as 
a new software technology, allowing tasks previously impossible or at least improbable, 
to be accomplished.  Assuming that improvements to our organization are only possible 
when a new technology delivers some missing capability makes the assumption that 
everything about our people, organizations, and processes was perfect and that the lack of 
capability delivered by the new technology was the root cause behind the particular 
problem.    Collaborative PLM as a software suite could be considered a new technology, 
it can deliver capabilities that our programs currently do not have, but implementing a 
collaborative PLM suite is only the first step toward organizing and improving the 
information available, enabling people and organizations to perform their practice and 
processes most efficiently.     
In his book Product Lifecycle Management Driving the Next Generation of LEAN 
Thinking, Michael Grieves described the relationship between technology, process, and 
people.  The book has a good discussion of the three main areas of an organization that 
must work together in order to be successful.  Figure 11 demonstrates how Grieves 
visually captured the interaction between technology and processes in effecting outcomes 
(Grieves, 2006). The first quadrant combines low technology and poor processes. This 
usually produces undesirable outcomes because of the tremendous waste of time, 
material, and energy.  In this quadrant, even routine tasks are not standardized. There is a 
lot of trial and error, as people are trying to figure out how to accomplish tasks, and little 
or no information is learned, resulting in rework and other non-value added activities.   
 
Figure 11.  Interactions Between Process and Technology  
(From Grieves, 2006) 
 
Improving the technology without addressing the process will move an 
organization into the second quadrant.  The high technology and poor process quadrant 
produces outcomes that may be more consistent, but not necessarily favorable for the 
organization.  An example would be if a new technology such as collaborative PLM 
automated an organization’s processes, without addressing the poor processes.  In this 
scenario, the control over the process offered by collaborative PLM actually becomes a 
burden to employees, because they are forced to comply with the poor process.  This will 
result in employees finding ways to work around the system or simply putting the least 
amount of effort possible to move through the bad process. Both results eliminate most of 
the benefits discussed in the previous chapters.  This behavior negatively impacts the 
return on investment for the system. Lack of understanding as to why outcomes are not 
improved is usually the justification for the next new technology that shows promise.   
The third quadrant of Figure 11 represents low technology but good processes. An 
actual example of this quadrant would be Toyota and their total production system (TPS).  
Toyota spends a lot of effort training its employees on how to analyze, improve, and 
document its processes.  They utilize low tech solutions such as Kanban cards.  While 
Kanban cards are common in manufacturing processes, they are in effect, the message 





replenishment of that product, part, or inventory.  Toyota has also been successful in 
using them in the design realm, shaving years off their design and engineering cycle 
(Spear, 2004). 
The final quadrant in the figure is the goal of each organization: high technology 
and good processes.  In this quadrant, the technology is organized and structured to 
enable the people to accomplish tasks more efficiently and more reliably than they could 
otherwise.  There is structure that not only ensures processes and practices are followed, 
but that they are continuously analyzed and improved to capture the knowledge needed to 
prevent repeated mistakes.  In this quadrant, the processes and practices are so well 
understood that they can be simulated in the virtual space, saving time, material, and 
energy (Grieves, 2006).  This is the quadrant where collaborative PLM can deliver the 
benefits needed to address the DoD acquisition portfolio’s woes.   
Absent from the four quadrants discussed above was the role of people. All the 
interactions between process and technology are dependent on the people in the 
organization.  When people operate with good intentions and are motivated and 
competent, they can figure out a way to improvise and will make even poor processes and 
low technology work for them.  However, if people set out with willful malice, they will 
use the same ingenuity and find ways to ensure that even the best processes fail.  Before 
presenting the case studies, lessons learned, and recommendation for the DoD 
shipbuilding-acquisition portfolio, it will be helpful to explore the impact of    
characteristics of practice, processes, organizations, people, information, and technology 
more thoroughly.   
1. Practices and Processes    
A ship design program manager should understand the differentiation between a 
process and practice in order to understand what and how adjustments need to be made 
and to know what a software vendor is promising with new technologies.   Michael 
Grieves explained this differentiation in his book, Project Lifecycle Management.  
Grieves pointed out that when, “thinking of organizations in a systems view, everything 
starts with given inputs. Processes then transform those inputs into a well-specified, 
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predictable, consistent set of outputs” (Grieves, 2006).  However, when looking at the 
Navy portfolio, while you can argue that lately outputs have been consistent and 
predictable, it would be hard to argue that those outputs are the desired results. Perhaps 
more attention needs to be paid to the so-called processes that transform the resources.    
When looking across the spectrum of ways to accomplish this transformation, 
there are multiple approaches to reaching the organizational objectives.  Collaborative 
PLM groups these approaches into three categories: “process,” “practice” or “art” 
(Grieves, 2006).  The most defined approach is a process; for example, a machine that 
takes a set quantity of material and runs at a set speed for a determined duration, 
producing a consistent output.  On the other end of the spectrum is the least defined 
approach: art.  Art begins with unclear inputs that are transformed through unorthodox 
applications fully understood only by the artist.  Art has the ability to produce a variety of 
outputs, to be selected based on how well they match requirements.  The results are 
subjective, and consensus may never be reached: for example, when deciding “What is 
the best hull shape for a new class of warship?”  In between the art and process is 
practice.  In practice, inputs and outputs are fairly well defined, but how they are 
transformed is not.  Practices rely on judgment and experience and often do not occur in 
the controlled environment, for instance, determining how to minimize the number of 
change orders to control the cost escalation of a program (Grieves, 2006).   
Pointing out the differences between these concepts is important for a few 
reasons.  First, it could provide an explanation as to why our programs struggle with 
inconsistent performance.  If the organization is executing processes, like the machine 
described previously, it is rational to eliminate unnecessary information and extra 
communications in order to LEAN the process. However, if the organization is in fact 
using practices, this approach could eliminate necessary information needed by the 
decision makers to make an informed decision.  Second, the differences are important in 
order to understand what a vendor is offering.  Before making the substantial investment 
in collaborative PLM, it would be necessary to be sure it is structured in a manner to 
enable operations with practices as well as processes.  For instance, a process is very 
structured and the goal is to move through the steps as efficiently as possible.  Practices 
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lack the same structure as processes so the goal is to collect enough data and information 
during each step to assist decision-makers to identify the patterns (Grieves, 2006).  For 
collaborative PLM to be helpful, it must have the ability to operate organization 
activities, whether practices or processes.  Collaborative PLM should help an 
organization categorize its tasks and evolve practices into processes wherever possible.  
Processes lend themselves to automation, thus freeing resources to concentrate on 
practices where perception and judgment are important.  
2. Organizations and People 
As mentioned above, the characteristics of the people will have a dramatic 
influence on the success of an organization.  The capabilities of people within any 
organization are varied.  Some of those characteristics contributing to an employee’s 
capability can be enhanced and will be discussed below. They are experience, education, 
training, and support (Grieves, 2006).    
a. Experience 
One definition of experience is active involvement in an activity or 
exposure to events or people over a period of time, which leads to an increase in 
knowledge or skill—basically, to keep the same theme in this paper, knowing how to use 
information to reduce wasted time, material, and energy.  Experience helps reduce the 
search time to find the information needed to predict the outcomes of situations with a 
higher probability of success.   
A problem with experience is that it is predominantly an individual 
characteristic, meaning when you lose the employee, you lose the experience.  The 
experience of the DoD’s workforce is one of the issues that will cause problems if not 
addressed.  Due to the downsizing and hiring freezes of the 1990s, a significant amount 
of the workforce is eligible to retire, and there is a gap between them and the large 
number of new hires waiting to take over.  This leaves a small window in which to 
transfer the requisite knowledge to those new workers.  We will explore specific 
recommendations later, but collaborative PLM can help in at least two general ways: 
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First, it can embed the information into the processes, and second, it can allow new 
operators to gain experience in the virtual world.             
b. Education and Training 
Real-world situations that present opportunities for employees to gain 
necessary experience cannot be scheduled. Unlike the real world, the virtual world can be 
used to simulate any situation, rather than waiting for the desired opportunity to present 
itself, and the virtual world to be scheduled.  This simulation is a method of education 
and training. Education teaches people why things are done, while training focuses on 
what to do.  Recall from earlier the differences between processes and practices.  
Education is suited to practices in which an understanding of how inputs affect outputs is 
needed in order to determine what is relevant versus what is irrelevant before deciding on 
a course of action.  Training is better applied to processes in which the actions required 
are standardized and produce consistent results.  The accuracy of these virtual 
simulations is dependent on information captured by collaborative PLM during real-
world events.             
c. Support 
Even if a person learns something during education and training, this does 
not guarantee that they will be able to remember it when that information is actually 
needed.  Support functions to supplement education and training by providing a network 
of people who can assist in searching, recalling, or relearning the information when 
required.   
John Seeley Brown, the former director of Xerox PARC, provided an 
interesting analogy concerning the support function.  While investigating how copier 
repair technicians solved complicated problems, he concluded that “when the going gets 
tough, the tough get coffee” (Brown & Duguid, 2002).  When looking at morning coffee 
breaks from a LEAN perspective, a logical conclusion is that coffee breaks were non 
value-added activities and technicians should seek to eliminate them to improve 
efficiency.  However, these coffee breaks were not wasted time. Instead, they were a 
support activity in which all the technicians gathered and discussed and collectively 
 59
diagnosed solutions to their individual problems.  Thus, eliminating the coffee breaks 
would have had a negative effect on efficiency.      
Collaborative PLM needs to have support functions that provide assistance 
for product information as well as control how the supporting technology will interact 
with the collaborative PLM suite in order to prevent people from becoming inefficient or 
frustrated.   
3. Information/Technology 
The success and capability of any particular collaborative PLM application is 
dependent on the capability and availability of the underlying technology.  Availability 
refers to the infrastructure required at an organization.  Obviously, all infrastructure costs 
money to establish. However, establishing the proper balance is necessary to get a good 
return on investment.  Excess infrastructure does not deliver any benefits, so the 
investment is wasted. Meanwhile, missing infrastructure will restrict access, limiting the 
potential benefits. People will find workarounds or simply avoid the system if it lacks, for 
example, adequate computing power, communications bandwidth, and storage capacity. 
Therefore, proper infrastructure does not determine collaborative PLM success, but 
improper infrastructure could dictate failure.  The recommendations contained in the 
following chapters do not try to determine the scale of proper infrastructure as this is 
dependent on the extent to which these recommendations are applied.  
a. Applications 
It is unlikely that one of the relatively few collaborative PLM providers is 
capable of developing, providing, and updating the entire collaborative PLM software 
suite (as well as all the applications necessary to design, build, and maintain the 
shipbuilding portfolio).  By selecting a one-company solution, a tremendous amount of 
risk is assumed because success is entirely dependent on the products, quality, and 
evolution of that one company.  A better strategy is to develop interoperability standards 
so that applications are compatible and have the ability to transfer and use data amongst 
themselves.          
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Software should be developed to reflect how people do their jobs versus 
people changing how their jobs are done to accommodate the easiest way to program the 
software.  The collaborative PLM software and applications should be embedded into the 
practices and processes so that they work as a seamless unit.  For collaborative PLM to 
be fully embedded into practices and processes and adopted by the workforce, it must be 
completely reliable when capturing, retrieving, and using product data.       
b. The Virtualization of Physical Objects 
Technology development has experienced an unbelievable trajectory, 
constantly redefining what is possible, which projects very well for the future.  Briefly 
looking at this progression, we can begin with storytelling, as an example, storytelling 
would be error-prone due to its reliance on the accuracy of the teller, as well as the 
comprehension of the receiver.  As storytelling progressed, people supplemented the oral 
description with pictures, eventually mastering the ability to create physical drawings 
showing length, width, and depth. When accompanied by other data, this opened up the 
ability to create physical mockups with complete accuracy.  However, these 
advancements still had limitations. For instance, as the richness of information increased 
from descriptions to drawings to mockups, the time needed to create these mockups 
increased, as did the resources required to transport them across the geographically 
expanding organizations.  With computers and the Internet, the resources required for 
transportation have decreased substantially. However, these drawings and models were 
still just a snapshot of the design at a moment in time.  Today, it is possible to operate in 
a full virtual environment. Designers can pick up, move, make changes to, and interact 
with the design as if it was a real object, all in real time.  
One of the values of collaborative PLM comes from the ability to access 
and leverage product information wherever it resides. One example is the simulation 
software that supports virtual product development (VPD) in a collaborative PLM 
strategy, notes Bob Ryan, executive vice president, of MSC.  Software Corporation 
(Teresko, 2004b).  According to Ryan, the VPD facilitates the innovation process, “how 
to design products for form, fit, function and manufacturability.  As part of an optimal 
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collaborative PLM strategy VPD can easily and effectively relate to other aspects of a 
product's lifecycle, such as inventory, maintenance and related considerations” (Teresko, 
2004b, p. 1).  
With an optimized collaborative PLM/VPD strategy, in other words, 
improving the integration of physical and virtual building and testing of the product, the 
result is accelerated innovation and greatly reduced risk at a lower cost.  To maximize the 
benefits of virtual product development, Ryan recommended viewing physical “build-
and-test” as a complement to virtual “build-and-test.”  An example of Ryan’s 
recommendation is the Boeing 777. As the first digital aircraft, it went beyond the 
traditional use of CAD by checking form and fit with a digital mockup.  Boeing then 
virtually flew the aircraft, checking the landing gear and other systems functionality 
(Teresko, 2004a).   
Ryan stressed that VPD's goal should be to integrate testing automation 
into the mainstream collaborative PLM environment. His advice: Start by studying how 
VPD automation can solve existing design problems. The second step: Research the 
benefits VPD automation can bring to new design initiatives. The final level is to achieve 
the ability to do design signoffs by using simulation instead of physical tests. The end 
point arrives when simulation can drive all of the product definition throughout the 
supply chain (Teresko, 2004a, p. 1). 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the synergy between organization, people, information, 
technology, processes, and practices and the impact it has in creating a successful 
organization.  A program manager should understand the differentiation between a 
process and practice in order to understand what and how adjustments need to be made 
and to know what a software vendor is promising with new technologies.  A process 
transforms those inputs into a well-specified, predictable, consistent set of outputs, versus 
a practice where inputs and outputs are fairly well defined, but how they are transformed 
is not.  Practices rely on judgment and experience and often do not occur in the controlled 
environment. 
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When people within our organization operate with good intentions and are 
motivated and competent, they can figure out a way to improvise and will make even 
poor processes and low technology work for them.  Some of the characteristics 
contributing to an employee’s capability can be enhanced by improving their experience, 
education, training, and support.   
The success and capability of any particular collaborative PLM application is 
dependent on the capability and availability of the underlying technology.  Software 
should be developed to reflect how people do their jobs, versus people changing how 
their jobs are done to accommodate the easiest way to program the software.  The 
collaborative PLM software and applications should be embedded into the practices and 
processes so that they work as a seamless unit.  For collaborative PLM to be fully 
embedded into practices and processes and adopted by the workforce, it must be 
completely reliable when capturing, retrieving, and using product data.  The selected 
collaborative PLM application needs to fully take advantage of the benefits gained by 
operating in the virtual environment; the upfront effort it takes to build a rich 
environment will be worthwhile, as correcting errors or making modifications are 
substantially cheaper and faster than performing the same modification to a physical 
product.   
 
VI. FUTURE STATE OF DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: 
ESTABLISHING A HEALTHY FOUNDATION  
This chapter focuses on reforms that will create a healthier organization in terms 
of DoD acquisition processes, ensuring that the workers have the knowledge and 
flexibility to adjust course when the plan begins to go awry.  The recommendations 
contained below are not explicitly tied to the deployment of collaborative PLM, but 
collaborative PLM offers capabilities magnifying the expected benefits of these reforms 
and these reforms will help institutionalize collaborative PLM applications, which can 
reduce acquisition costs and TOC.       
A. CREATING A NATIONAL DESIGN ORGANIZATION (NDO) 
In 1936, Theodore Paul Wright described the effect of learning on labor 
productivity in the aircraft industry and proposed a mathematical model of the learning 
curve, Figure 12 (Wright, 1936).   
 
 
Figure 12.  Representation of the Learning Curve  
(From Wright, 1936) 
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The theory estimates the changing rate of learning during a set activity or tool. 
Typically, the increase in retention of information is highest during the initial attempts, 
and then gradually evens out, meaning that less and less new information is retained after 
each repetition. However, today each new acquisition design program begins at the 
bottom of the learning curve, because each program is initiated by forming a new team 
with many members, who may have never completed a ship design or at least never 
worked together previously.   
Dan Billingsley would like to change this practice of beginning each new ship 
design program with a new team, and when we discussed this inefficient practice, he 
stressed the need for an organization to provide sound designs in response to the 
emerging and ever-changing needs of the entire acquisition portfolio (D. Billingsley, 
personal communications, April 5, 2010).  His 30 plus years of experience in the 
acquisition community has led him to believe that a single design organization initiating 
each new design would have a series of positive benefits.  The main function of a 
national design organization (NDO) would be to provide structure and leadership during 
the early design phases and deliver trusted products (cost, performance, schedule, and 
risk estimates).  This organization should be comprised of representatives from each 
phase of the lifecycle: design, production, maintenance, and operation domains.  
Applying the learning-curve concept, by having one team handle all the designs, this 
team will have the opportunity to learn from previous mistakes and provide a design to 
serve as a solid foundation for each new program.  The NDO would also serve as the 
custodian for each of the reforms contained in this research.   
The NDO would also be charged with grooming new engineers, establishing and 
maintaining design and engineering standards, providing a focal point for fleet feedback, 
developing and maturing analytic tools required during design and certification, and 
ensuring that product data interoperability standards evolve and are followed.  Billingsley 
contended the foundation of a successful program would be established by having every 
design begin under the same roof, ensuring that the up to 80% of TOC set by those early 
decisions are made by the most experienced team possible (D. Billingsley, personal 
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communications, April 5, 2010).  It will also benefit institutionalizing collaborative PLM 
as the design team will become very familiar and comfortable operating in its virtual 
environment.   
During a meeting with the DDG-1000 program office a comment was made that 
the Navy is still performing a majority of its functions, such as reviewing drawings or 
collaborating on documents, outside the collaborative PLM environment simply because 
their workers were unfamiliar and unconfident completing tasks within collaborative 
PLM (J. Watson, personal communication, April 5, 2010).  This hurdle of training an 
organization as large as NAVSEA and the Program Offices will still need to be addressed 
and will actually be magnified, as eventually that list will be expanded to include sailors, 
vendors, and contractors that will be involved with the ship throughout the lifecycle.  The 
time needed to train individuals until they are comfortable within the collaborative PLM 
environment will not only take away time from actual ship design tasks, but also, until 
they are proficient within collaborative PLM, the quality of those tasks could also be 
compromised.  The NDO should be responsible for conducting the preliminary ship 
design for every new program, as the decisions made during this portion of the program 
have dramatic impacts, the design should be conducted by a team that, through repetition, 
is already familiar with the intricacies of collaborative PLM and can focus solely on the 
quality of the design.  The NDO can build a solid foundation for a new ship program so 
that when transferred into the program office’s responsibility, the majority of the critical 
decisions have already been made to reflect the best interest of the program from the total 
lifecycle perspective.  The program office will be responsible for overseeing the 
contractor conducting the detail design and construction.           
Lastly, the NDO will be charged with supporting the process during follow-on 
stages of design and construction, providing continuity to the new ship program, and, 
most importantly, witnessing the ramifications of early decisions in learning and 
improving the process (D. Billingsley, personal communications, April 5, 2010).  
Billingsley’s position is: “our organizations have become very product centric.” By this, 
he means that large investments will be made in order to gain any amount of value when 
it concerns the product: for instance, the large investments required to develop a new 
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technology such as the rail gun. Operating the organization as described above would 
assign the same emphasis on improving the processes.  The NDO would have the 
repetitions necessary to travel up the collaborative PLM and ship design learning curves; 
they would be familiar with the collaborative PLM environment, and would be able to 
leverage the capabilities of the new technology to improve the ship design process.  Once 
the ship design process is improved it will pay dividends across all product lines, present 
and future (D. Billingsley, personal communications, April 5, 2010).  Calling for a design 
organization does not require disestablishment of the program offices that currently 
handle new acquisition projects.  The current structure of program offices is held 
accountable mainly to the acquisition unit cost of their programs.  Once the preliminary 
design is complete, it can be transferred to the program office and contractors for 
complete detail design and construction.  Mission funding the NDO as a standalone 
organization would allow the focus to be placed on producing the best design for the 
Navy across the entire lifecycle, as opposed to the current funding structure, which 
incentivizes program managers to prioritize staying below acquisition unit cost 
thresholds.   
B. GROOMING AN EXPERIENCED DESIGN WORKFORCE  
The experience of a design team can be an influential factor of project success.  
Experience can overcome many shortfalls and seize opportunity when it presents itself.  
Figure 13 is from a study demonstrating how an experienced design team building one-
of-a-kind oil platforms resulted in a 20–25% cost savings, as compared to an 
inexperienced design team (Keane, Fireman, Hough, Helgerson, & Whitcomb, 2008).  
Secretary of the Navy Winter understood this concept. He emphasized the importance of 
experience: 
Hiring top quality people who have experience with large shipbuilding 
programs is essential. The ability to assign an experienced and capable 
team must be a precondition to a program’s initiation. Finding and 
developing the people we need is easier said than done, and it will take 
time to rectify this problem, but we cannot ignore the leverage that can be 
obtained by putting the right, experienced and prepared people, in the right 
positions. (Winter, 2007) 
  
Figure 13.  Experience of Design Team Drives Cost Performance  
(From Keane, Fireman, Hough, et al., 2008) 
 
NAVSEA has successfully maintained a core of highly skilled, experienced ship-
design leaders.  However, this experienced core has continued to age since the hiring 
freezes in the '90s, and these ship-design leaders are beginning to retire in rather 
significant numbers.   
In FY2008, 15% of the acquisition workforce was eligible for retirement. In ten 
years, this will climb to 54% among current employees (Federal Acquisition Institute, 
2009).  Ben Kassel, currently with Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock, commented 
that during a significant portion of the 1990s, NAVSEA accomplished its downsizing 
mandate by limiting new hires, a decision that today is the cause of another problem.  
This hiring policy created a gap of experienced workers who today would be capable of 
assuming all the duties as older workers retire (B. Kassel, personal communication, April 
6, 2010).  The response has been hiring a large number of entry-level engineers. While 
this strategy will meet the full-time equivalent quota, it still leaves the monumental task 
of ensuring that the accumulated knowledge of the older workforce is transferred to these 
new hires.  Dan Billingsley estimates that it takes five years of experience before an 
engineer truly understands the complexity of ships and can contribute to the design effort 
(Billingsley, 2010).  Compounding this problem is the fact that today’s programs 
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currently take at least 10–15 years to work through the design phase (GAO, 2008b).  This 
means a new hire at best will be trained by an experienced worker through one cycle, but 
more than likely, a new hire will only experience a partial cycle before assuming the 
reins.  The urgent challenge is how to effectively transfer the design experience to this 
new workforce.    
However, what these new hires lack in experience, they have the ability to 
compensate for by being comfortable with software and other high-tech tools coming into 
the marketplace.  The Navy has implemented simulators into its warfighter-training 
plans.  Ship drivers, pilots, and shooters all receive simulator training as a cheap, reliable, 
controlled way of gaining experience. The acquisition community does not have a 
comparable set of tools to train workers in the virtual environment.        
Training is part of daily life in the Navy and should be part of the NDO’s life as 
well.  Effective training has the ability to improve on the estimated five years needed to 
gain experience.  During times when the NDO has either no active program or the active 
program does not require the entire organization, training could occur.  A team could be 
assigned to design a major project to near production-level detail, and then evaluate the 
design.  “Engineering a Solution to Ship Acquisition Woes,” presented the following 
benefits that can be expected by conduction of this type of exercise: 
 The exercises serve as individual and organizational training. 
 The exercises help ensure familiarity with the analytical tool kit as well as 
areas of weakness. 
 Being able to experiment with new design processes and really push the 
envelope would be possible without adding risk to a particular program.  
Often, more is learned from failure than from success. In a training scenario, 
not being concerned with failure could lead to unexpected breakthroughs.    
 Since schedule is not an issue, several iterations of a design could be 
accomplished to fully explore the trade and determine optimal solutions.    
 It would provide the opportunity to mature design products, and as designs are 
completed, they can be stored as a digital library. Once archived, the design 
can be reinitiated and modified in response to an emerging threat or need 
(Billingsley, 2010). 
The military conducts war games constantly, trying to forecast the future and make sure 
that we are never caught off guard.  Yet today the acquisition community is conditioned 
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to hop from one active program to the next, without the opportunity to plan, prepare, and 
train adequately.  Implementing design exercises can correct that deficiency.   
A second benefit of these design exercises is that true innovation cannot be 
forced, the best ideas rarely come on cue, and when a program is constrained by a 
schedule, the entire design space is rarely explored, before having to moving on.  These 
design exercises serve to capture and preserve ideas when they do come.  A collaborative 
PLM suite would incorporate this “idea bank” to capture all the inspiration, be it needs, 
products, services, processes, policies, or insights that people come up with, but are not 
directly related to the current efforts.   
Collaborative PLM has extensive vaulting, search, and organizational capabilities 
that would be ideal to contain this knowledge bank and ensure that it is easy to use, 
protected, accessible, and captures the right information so that the ideas can be searched 
later.  Collaborative PLM also can store several configurations of the same project.  For 
instance, if during one of the design exercises, a decision must be made concerning a 
tradeoff between two technologies that will take the project in different directions, 
collaborative PLM offers the designers a unique way of addressing the decision.  Inside 
the collaborative PLM architecture, both alternatives can be worked simultaneously by 
creating a snapshot of the project at that point in time, duplicating it, and then exploring 
both alternatives.  This will help ensure that the entire trade space is explored and 
prevents delays if one of the alternatives turns out to be a dead end.   
Each design exercise does not have to start as a clean sheet design.  Rather, they 
can offer the opportunity to iterate through designs, leveraging the contents of the idea 
bank, evaluating and evolving ideas to either match current threats, integrate new 
technologies, or correct deficiencies.  The idea is that when an actual design is needed, a 
majority of the work has already been accomplished; thereby shortening time elapsed 
before it can be delivered to the warfighter.  Or, by making the best use of the schedule to 
explore the entire trade space, the design would be optimized to ensure that it is the best 
design capable.         
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At the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), students volunteer to participate in a 
design exercise referred to as the total ship systems engineering (TSSE) project.  It is a 
design exercise as described above. The intention is to give experience to students who 
will, upon leaving NPS, work in the acquisition community on active programs.  The 
students are provided a project that addresses a need of the Navy; they then attempt to 
work through the entire design process, from a clean sheet to a presentable design.  With 
proper structure, this program could be improved, to not only expand the student 
experience, but also to deliver something valuable to the Navy.  The previous student 
design team commented that the exercise lacked sufficient mentorship from the 
acquisition community.  They made an assumption because they did not have access to 
the appropriate data, then discovered during their final presentation that the assumption 
was incorrect, invalidating their design proposal.  My group is having a similar 
experience as we are halfway through our design exercise, and we have not interacted 
with the stakeholders of our design concept.  Once the NDO is formulated, part of their 
task should be to mentor this and other TSSE programs across the country.  One of the 
strengths of collaborative PLM is that since it is web based, NPS could purchase a seat on 
the NAVSEA Integrated Data Exchange (IDE) and use the same idea bank, design tools, 
common parts catalogue, social networking, and support that actual NAVSEA engineers 
are using.  These would not only improve the TSSE program with regards to student 
education, but perhaps the students could accomplish something of actual value for 
NAVSEA.        
C. PRODUCT DATA INTEROPERABILITY (PDI) 
The last two sections recommended reforms such as creating the NDO and used 
design exercises to groom inexperienced workers through training exercises.  Next, we 
will move into ways to assist the people and design organization in their direct efforts on 
executing value-added tasks of the ship-development process.  Daniel Billingsley has 
defined these value-added tasks as “knowledge-work and analysis, decision-making, and 
problem solving associated with development, construction, and support during the 
service life” (Billingsley, 2006).  In several white papers and most recently at the ASNE 
symposium, he estimated that in NAVSEA, this knowledge work accounts for 
approximately one-third of their total obligation authority, or $7.2 billion each year (D. 
Billingsley, personal communications, April 5, 2010).  This is a significant portion of the 
budget and is a prime area to look for improvements.       
Studies have shown that 50–90% of a knowledge worker’s time is spent on non-
value-added preparatory tasks (locating, retrieving, verifying, transforming, and 
recreating) and then follow-on tasks (recording, distributing, and storing) (Keane, 2007).  
By eliminating or reducing these non value-added activities, either cycle-time can be 
reduced or more time can be allocated to improving the product; either scenario is 
beneficial.  
The amount of preparatory and follow-on tasks stems from the organization 
necessary to handle the immense and overwhelming amount of data involved in a 
warship design.  One of the challenges is efficiently getting the right data to the right 
person when needed so that it can be used productively.  Programs recently have begun to 
design integrated product development environments (IPDE) to support integrated 
information processing to address this challenge.  IPDEs are systems that have both 3D 
product data and management capabilities, in addition to document-management 
capabilities. Figure 14 shows the IPDE created for the LPD 17 program (Murphy, 1997). 
 
Figure 14.  LPD 17 IPDE  




These environments are very similar to the collaborative PLM suites discussed in 
Chapter II, but seem to lack the total lifecycle perspective that was common in the 
collaborative PLM suites evaluated.  The IPDE’s were created and used during the design 
and manufacturing phases of a program, but were not designed to be transferred and used 
during the operation and sustainment phases.  For instance, the designers did not design 
the IPDEs to capture and leverage the knowledge learned or the problems experienced by 
the ship operators or maintainers, nor were 3D product models available to the operators 
or maintainers (P. Hudson, personal communication, April 6, 2010). 
1. Program-Specific IPDEs are Less Than Ideal 
Whether integrated into a collaborative PLM suite or as a stand-alone unit, IPDEs 
have promising upsides.  However, significant software developmental and integration 
challenges are also present.  There are several Commercial Off-the-shelf (COTS) IPDEs 
and collaborative PLM options. However, due to the complexity of information being 
processed and the limited market, none of them are specifically tailored to support naval 
ship programs.  This means that shipbuilders and programs independently work with the 
vendors to build IPDEs from COTS components and custom interfaces.  For a major 
shipbuilding program, the IPDE could total $150–200 million, of which 45–55% is 
integration planning, information engineering, and interface software development 
(Keane, Fireman, & Billingsley, 2007).  With each program office paying to custom build 
its IPDE to meet its requirements, processes, relationships, and to take advantage of the 
latest hardware and software developments, there are no incentives to build 
interoperability or lifecycle features. In “Ready to design a Naval ship? Prove it!” Keane, 
Fireman, Hough, Helgerson and Whitcomb outlined various problems associated with 
this ad hoc process: 
 Duplication of development effort across many programs, 
 Multiple partially integrated systems that are not interoperable with others, 
 Annual integration expenses of $10–30 million for each major program, 
 Multiple incompatible systems at each shipyard, and 
 Numerous inconsistent sources of product information for Navy engineering 
and support during the service life. (Keane, Fireman, Hough, et al., 2008) 
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An assumption can be made, that because many of the recent acquisition 
programs have taken on the expense to create individual IPDEs, they assessed the 
capabilities and determined the benefits were greater.  However, these tools would be 
even more powerful if they had the ability to leverage knowledge and effort across the 
entire enterprise, versus being limited to their own programs.  Creating a Navy enterprise 
IPDE would eliminate each of the problems discussed above.     
2. The Need for Standards, not Selection 
The enterprise-wide solution could be accomplished in several different ways. 
The Navy could pick a particular vendor to create the entire enterprise-wide solution. 
Another way could be for various vendors to operate under the same PDI standards.  The 
first option is unadvisable, because it puts a tremendous amount of pressure on selecting 
the appropriate vendor, as once that vendor has a monopoly on the market, there is less 
incentive to improve its product to meet evolving needs or shortcomings.  The more 
advisable solution is to spend the time and effort to ensure that all of our data, regardless 
of what particular software vendor is being used, is transferable between platforms.   
Investment in PDI from 1986 through 2004 totaled approximately $61.3 million, 
$26.3 million of which was used directly by the Navy. The original focus was on 
transferring CAD data between shipyards to support the “lead-yard,” “follow-yard” 
business model (Keane, Fireman, Hough, et al., 2008). Billingsley (2006) argued that an 
enterprise-wide strategy for product interoperability has certain benefits over individual 
IPDEs, including:  
 Enable introduction of improved and third-party capability in specific areas, 
including discipline-focused software developed by ABS, Office of Naval 
Research (ONR), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
academia, and industry. 
 Reduce or eliminate the need for multiple IPDEs within a single yard. 
 Enable acquisition programs to re-use engineering tools and data-management 
components developed by preceding programs. 
 More flexibility in teaming and second-sourcing. 




 Enabling common methods of handling product data for support during the 
service life.  
 Ability to utilize archived data in current-generation systems (Billingsley, 
2006). 
3. Impact of product data interoperability (PDI) 
The benefits to the shipbuilding enterprise and timing of pay back can be hard to 
quantify.  Three attempts have been made to quantify the savings once PDI is achieved; 
the results vary between $150–450 million (Billingsley, 2006).  
Achieving product data interoperability will: 
 Make cross-program collaboration possible,  
 Allow the Navy to control policies and contract terms for product data for 
acquisition and support during the service life, 
 Format data to be useful during each phase of lifecycle,  
 Enable communication of shipbuilder designs to NAVSEA for design review 
and certification, 
 Enable NAVSEA to give guidance focusing on software development by 
ABS, ONR, DARPA, universities, and industry, 
 Enable acquisition programs to re-use engineering tools and data management 
components developed by preceding programs, 
 Enable common methods of handling product data for support during the 
service life. (Keane, Fireman, Hough, et al., 2008) 
 
PDI will not itself solve any of the issues that are leading to the unsustainable cost 
growth or the unrealized TOC being experienced today because it deals only with the 
transferability of data.  However, all of the solutions depend on the efficient flow of 
quality information throughout the enterprise.  Program risk will be reduced by cost 
savings associated with eliminating the need for expensive translators that must be 
updated frequently to account for software updates.  Technical risk will be reduced 
because technical warrant holders will not have to waste time transferring and translating 
data before analyzing it (R. Keane, personal communication, April 8, 2010).  Programs 
will be able to re-use designs, eliminating the need to start with a blank sheet of paper 
each time.  Managers will have an easier time approving data because it will always be in 
the same format.   
The Virginia Class program should serve as a model for how to achieve PDI.  
Congress decided that two submarine yards are required for national strategic reasons.  In 
February 1997, Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding entered into an unusual 
co-production team arrangement (see Figure 15).  The construction is split evenly 
between the two yards with each alternating as the lead integrator.  Each yard is operating 
a collaborative PLM system and have successfully shared data and collaborated between 
the two yards during execution of this program.  Collaborative PLM allowed them to 
work from one design even though they were geographically separated.  Their efforts 
ensured no surprises occurred as they constructed components in one yard, put them on a 
barge, and shipped them to the other yard for assembly (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 
2002).   
 
Figure 15. Workflow Between Electric Boat and Newport News 
(From General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
While PDI will not solve any problems, the lack of it is a barrier that could 
prevent other reforms from being successful.  The Navy will not realize all the benefits of 
collaborative PLM if the data is not interoperable and knowledge can be leveraged across 
the entire portfolio.      
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D. DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION TOOLS 
Just as the small, specialized shipbuilding market makes necessary the 
development of a customized collaborative PLM suite, it also means the industry cannot 
expect the associated tools and applications needed to support the design and technical 
warrant holders to be developed without the guidance and investment of the Navy.  This 
is yet another reason to support data standards and interoperability, as it would allow 
myriad sources (public, private, and academic) to develop tools in a fashion that would 
ensure they are capable of being integrated into the collaborative PLM suite while 
eliminating the translators and the recoding traditionally required to ensure compatibility.  
Independent of the design source, a mature tool kit is critical, because by the end of the 
design phase, 80% of TOC is set, so those early decisions can offer the greatest potential 
or dire consequences (Briggs et al., 2009).  Collaborative PLM is going to be able to 
capture and organize data that our programs have never had before.  Real world data 
collected from operational ships can be statistically analyzed to determine what are the 
most important predictive metrics to track.   
Keane, McIntire, Fireman, and Maher (2009) argue that operational architecture 
tools such as those being developed by the NAVSEA Future Concepts and Surface Ship 
Design Group could address the shortcomings of the ship synthesis models that existed at 
the time of the LPD-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis (p. 49).   
When comparing ship options, a better understanding of what options are optimal 
is needed. Tools (algorithms) exist that optimize the design parameters of a ship concept.  
Keane, McIntire, et al. discuss two of these tools. Georgia Tech’s Unified Trade 
Environment method thoroughly searches the entire design solution space better, 
calculating differences between various ship options.  Virginia Tech’s Overall Measure 
of Effectiveness enables the prioritizing and quantifying operational requirements to 
drive the design optimization computations. Prioritization of requirements was achieved 
by a pair-wise comparison hierarchy with experienced operators, ship designers, and 
program managers from a wide range of disciplines (Keane, McIntire, et al., 2009, p. 49). 
Numerous options need to be studied prior to settling on a new ship concept. The 
quicker each of these options can be created and evaluated, the more iterations can occur, 
creating the potential for a better product.  The tools that project a particular concept’s 
technical, risk, and cost characteristics must produce consistent, trusted results or 
decision-makers cannot possibly make a sound evaluation based on merits.    
1. Current Tools Need Development 
NAVSEA can improve the design and engineering tools and applications 
available to assist its engineers in making sound decisions, while evaluating the multiple 
options of a particular design.  Ship design concepts are an accumulation of decisions 
evaluating particular systems or components against a set of requirements and 
assumptions.  Each criteria used to make a decision is another axis, that when combined, 
forms a point in multi dimensional design space. Each iteration of the design provides the 
opportunity to change one of the variables, creating a new point forming the field 
showing what is possible (Billingsley, 2006).  This is a good method to validate certain 
assumptions and to decide which point estimate is best. There is minimal risk while 
extrapolating between the point estimates.  However, as demonstrated by Figure 16, there 
is no guarantee that the point estimates calculated contain the optimal solution, and 
extrapolation beyond the points introduces a tremendous amount of risk.   
   
Figure 16.  Conventional Approach for Design Space Exploration 




Current early stage ship-design tools have the following deficiencies for rough 
order of magnitude (ROM) and feasibility level studies: 
 Inability to conduct real-time cost assessments, 
 Inability to assess total ship survivability at the concept level, 
 Inability to conduct topside design assessments at the concept level, 
 Inability to conduct weapon systems-effectiveness assessments, 
 Inability to conduct preliminary ship-manning analysis, 
 Inability to analyze a wide range of unconventional hull-form alternatives, 
 Inability to conduct preliminary maneuverability assessments, 
 Inability to conduct rapid design space exploration in order to narrow 
down the range of acceptable ship concept alternatives, and 
 No flexibility, transparency, or scalability (Billingsley, 2006) 
2. Impact Once Completed 
Over the past several years, the Navy has been attempting to address these 
shortcomings, but it needs to continue to fund the efforts into design space exploration 
using response surface methodology (RSM) (Billingsley, 2006).  This new approach 
leverages the power of computers to automate the systematic exploration of the design 
space, once enough data is entered into the system, the computer can cycle through 
various combinations, testing them virtually.  It would be cost prohibitive to build a mock 
up and test physically the number of combinations that a computer can cycle through; 
however, a computer’s virtual modeling could enable the decision-makers to decide 
which combinations would be valuable to test physically and which options should be 
eliminated from consideration.  This increased information decreases the risk of 
interpolation and allows for the selection of the truly optimized solution, meeting 
competing objectives (Figure 17).  Continuing to mature these technologies is critical, but 
it is only half of what is needed.  Collecting data throughout a ship’s lifecycle is a 
necessity so that these models can be validated and trusted.  
 
 
Figure 17.  New Approach for Design Space Exploration 
(From Billingsley, 2010) 
 
The designers and technical warrant holders must respond to all program requests, 
regardless of the stored format of the data.  If each program collects different information 
and stores it in a different format, (i.e. the data lacks interoperability), the process 
becomes more difficult. This scenario would require the retrieval of the data, and then the 
translation of data so that it can be evaluated in the format required for the particular tool 
being used.  Then, after the analysis, the data must be converted back into its original 
form and assimilated back into the original program, so that it can be used.  Those are all 
wasted steps that require time and effort.  PDI will eliminate these wasted efforts to allow 
the time to be spent either conducting a more thorough analysis or the elimination of an 
option, thus reducing cycle-time, both of which are beneficial.  
Once these tools are integrated into the collaborative PLM suite, they will have 
the access to the lifecycle data needed as the suite is populated, providing the ability to 
refine and evolve these tools, making them accurate and reliable.  Quantifying direct cost 
savings from a more comprehensive set of design and certification tools is difficult, but it 
is possible to see how the effort would lead to savings.  During the lifecycle, savings 
could come from providing tools where none currently exist in order to allow the 
evaluation of failures that have not been analyzed before.  Lifecycle savings would also 
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come from uncovering and correcting design issues before they ever reach the fleet.  The 
investment required to develop good software is insignificant compared to the cost of a 
failed system once in service.    
E. SECTION SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on reforms of the organization and the tools and people that 
comprise it, recreating a National Design Organization will be the lynchpin for any 
lasting reforms of the acquisition process.  An NDO would provide the focus and 
authority necessary to make meaningful changes and address many of the weaknesses.  It 
makes sense then that the most experienced well-trained individuals can make 
appropriate decisions, essentially locking in success, before transferring the project into 
the larger program offices of current operations.  Once this organization is in place, many 
of the other reforms outlined begin to fall into place with minimal effort.  For instance, 
the next wave of engineers can be mentored through various design exercises by the 
experienced engineers, building not only the digital idea bank, but their own experience 
and knowledge.  PDI will be easier to resolve, because all product data will originate 
inside the same organization, ensuring consistency.  This consistency will facilitate data 
transfer between programs and throughout the lifecycle, as well as provide standards for 
private or public development of the next generation of collaborative PLM or design 
tools. 
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VII. FUTURE STATE OF DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: 
ESTABLISHING SOUND PRACTICES AND PROCESSES  
This chapter will focus on some reforms that could have a dramatic effect on the 
ship acquisition process.  These reforms look at the practices and processes of the ship 
design and acquisition process and how they can be modified to leverage the capabilities 
of collaborative PLM applications.  Many of these incorporate lessons learned that have 
proven effective in other industries and can be adapted to shipbuilding. 
A. RECTIFY LACK OF EARLY SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: DECISIONS 
MADE BEFORE MILESTONE B  
The proper business case of a ship design program should stress the application of 
LEAN design principles as early as possible.  During these early stages, the flexibility to 
change design is highest, because as a design progresses into more detailed phases, the 
cost to make changes increases.  The National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) 
developed a strategic investment plan (SIP) outlining a business case with two main 
objectives: 1) focus on the application of LEAN concepts to the preproduction areas of 
design, thereby reducing cycle-time, non value-added activities, and the cost of ships; and 
2) focus leadership on process improvement, which is needed due to the multi-
organization efforts required to change design practices that are deeply embedded in the 
enterprise culture (Keane, Fireman, Hough, et al., 2008).    
In 2006, the DoD established a mandatory sustainment key performance 
parameter (KPP) requirement for acquisition systems.  The KPP has three main factors: 
system availability, reliability, and ownership costs.  The Defense Science Board gave 
the following recommendation in its May 2008 report:  
The single most important step necessary to correct high suitability failure 
rate is to ensure programs are formulated to execute a viable system 
engineering strategy from the beginning, including a robust reliability, 
availability, maintainability (RAM) program, as an integral part of design 
and development. No amount of testing will compensate for deficiencies 
in RAM program formulation (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 
2008). 
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However, the current practice lacks focus, and many programs pass through 
milestone B (entry into the engineering and manufacturing development phase), without a 
true understanding of the technical risk and projected TOC of the design, which can lead 
to cost and schedule growth during acquisition and higher than anticipated operating and 
maintenance costs, once transferred to the fleet.   
Several characteristics of the current acquisition structure drive this behavior.  
First, the unnecessarily long cycle-time (15 plus years for some programs).  To 
compensate for the long developmental time, programs must forecast technology that will 
be innovative 15 years from now. This incorporates a high degree of technical risks. 
Second, because a program must be fully funded, managers underestimate costs and risk 
in order to sell the program and be established.  This competition for funds has led 
program managers to trade off lifecycle cost or capabilities to keep acquisition costs 
down.  Lastly, even when overruns and delays come to light, the program keeps going 
fueled by optimistic “fix-as-you-go” strategies, preventing the fiscal and political fallout 
associated with killing a program (R. Keane, personal communication, April 8, 2010).  
Pushing forward programs containing so much risk forces the government into cost-plus 
contracts, because no company can estimate a firm price on a design that is still evolving.    
All three of these issues can be addressed by limiting the developmental time to 
no longer than six years from milestone A, which signifies the start of technology 
development to low-rate initial production as recommended by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense (“Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assesment 
Project,” 2006).   
The Virginia Class (SSN 774 class) program has demonstrated that this cycle-
time is achievable, due to the effects of electronic design technology and integrated 
product and process development (IPPD) implementation.  Electric Boat reports that USS 
Ohio took more than 13 years and used 2,100 designers. USS Seawolf took about 13.5 
years and 1,850 designers. USS Virginia will have taken about 9 years and 1,150 




advances that incorporate more knowledge-base-driven design might further 
revolutionize the design process, cutting it to 4.5 years at 50% the current manpower 
(General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002). 
With the shorter cycle-time, the program requirements will more accurately 
reflect what the warfighter needs because there is less time for trends, missions, and 
threats to change.  The shorter cycle will force immature technologies out of 
consideration because programs no longer would have the schedule to allow these 
technologies to mature.   
Some other reforms are necessary in order to make this five-year timeline 
realistic.  First, it will be best to leave the technology development as the responsibility of 
the research labs, such as the ONR and DARPA.  The time spent maturing immature 
technology can be eliminated from the schedule.  Because all designs begin in the NDO, 
relationships can be established, fostering not only a smooth transfer of technology but 
also a focus point for the warfighter, feeding needs and desires into the design.  Once the 
NDO has its tasking, it can reach into collaborative PLM’s virtual idea bank and pull 
either a similar design or components from many designs to incorporate into the new 
program.  Because the NDO handles all new design, its engineers will be intimately 
familiar, from all the previous designs and exercises that they have completed, with both 
what is available in terms of the common component catalog, as well as what works and 
what does not.  This experience will help them turn out a better design, while setting the 
pace to meet the five-year goal.  Finally, as long as the funding stream for the NDO is 
established intelligently, they can be held accountable based on the quality of the design 
and avoid the pressure today’s program managers experience when meeting spending 
limits.  This pressure is understood and even drove the previous reform, separating the 
technical warrant holders responsible mainly for safety of ships and the program 
managers held accountable for cost and schedule.   
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B. USING STANDARD COMPONENTS AND PRODUCT STANDARDS 
We referred to the common parts catalog earlier and will discuss it further in this 
section.  Today, the Navy has to design, buy, and support thousands of different pump 
valves for surface ships and hundreds of different electrical controllers.  Leveraging 
previous designs and components needs to become a standard process during early stage 
design.  The “Affordability Through Commonality” Program highlighted the benefit of 
reducing the proliferation of similar parts in the fleet (Billingsley, 2010).  When each of 
our programs is operating in a fully integrated collaborative PLM environment with a 
common parts list, designer A can drag and drop a part or even an entire system created 
by designer B for a different program and save all the engineering cost to redesign, retest, 
and revalidate an identical part from scratch.  Perhaps some of the savings can be spent 
upgrading or optimizing the part or system to increase value. This improved part now 
becomes the new common part that designer C will use in a future project.  Savings will 
cascade throughout the lifecycle as use is made of a common parts catalogue.  The 
program manager will have risk reduced (cost, schedule, and performance) as the design 
matures and a real history is created.  Manufacturing will have one assembly line that it 
must keep open.  Supply will have fewer spare parts to purchase, store, inventory, and 
ship.  Operators will have fewer systems to learn how to operate and maintain.  
Maintainers will have fewer systems that they must repair.   
Strictly controlling the introduction of new parts into the design is effective if 
established at the start.  For example, Electric Boat noted that USS Seawolf had over 
100,000 unique parts that required separate purchase actions, storage control, and 
consideration for spare parts support.  The Virginia Class program had a policy that new 
parts could only be introduced into the design with the approval of a single individual, 
and the result was a limited number of unique parts. For the Virginia Class, Electric Boat 
built a standard, approved parts library inside its collaborative PLM system.  Of the 
105,400 parts available for review from the USS Seawolf (SSN-21) design, Virginia’s 
team reviewed about 98,000 of them and selected about 15,000 as USS Virginia standard 
parts. The final design will have fewer than one fifth the unique parts compared to USS 
Seawolf. This parts reduction strategy has a direct effect on administrative costs for 
 85
purchasing and storage for ship construction, and will reduce the amount of spares 
required for life cycle support (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002). 
To get the most of a common catalog, the engineers must know what is in it.  
Each of the collaborative PLM suites evaluated contained a method to search and recall 
information based on a variety of parameters.  Because all designs will be initiated under 
one roof (the NDO), it will be easy to ensure the processes remain consistent, regardless 
of platform.  This means, basically, that data is data and will become interchangeable. 
Yesterday, the task may have been designing a pump for LPD 17 and today, for LCS. 
The function of the pump did not change, so why should the design?  The constant design 
exercises will not only keep the idea bank full with ready-to-go designs, but it will also 
keep the engineers up to date with what has already been done before, constantly 
updating design, making improvements, and creating the new standards.  This helps give 
a reason that past efforts have not been complete successes.  A second disadvantage of 
any commonality program is the potential to limit competitiveness, as only those 
products conforming to the standard are eligible for consideration, regardless of the 
quality of the product.  A technology, such as collaborative PLM, capable of storing, 
sorting, and using huge amounts of data is only half of the solution.  It must be paired 
with a healthy organization that understands not only which data is available for 
incorporation into the design, but also how to interact with a database such as 
collaborative PLM efficiently so that it is easier to find current design, as opposed to 
simply doing it over again.        
C. MANAGING RISK TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES 
1. Private-Sector Retire Risk Prior to Contract Signing 
As budgets shrink, decision-makers will have to determine what programs are to 
receive the reduced funds.  However, the volatility of the cost estimates is one thing that 
gets managers called before Congress. In 2009, 96 programs evaluated by the GAO were 
a cumulative $296 billion over budget.  Overruns of this magnitude will make any 
planning ineffective, and will cripple the acquisition programs if not addressed as the 
funds dry up (GAO, 2010).   
Removing programmatic risk as early as possible is a proven method to reduce 
the volatility currently plaguing the naval acquisition portfolio.  Analysis provides an 
opportunity to not only gain a full understanding of the potential risks associated with a 
particular project, but also to determine if those risks can be mitigated prior to bidding on 
the ship.  If the shipbuilder fails to mitigate the risks, it could encounter problems later in 
the construction process that will require additional unplanned resources.  It would be 
difficult for shipbuilders to stay competitive with extra capacity available; thus, these 
unplanned resources would likely be pulled from other projects, potentially cascading 
through the entire organization, delaying multiple ships, and damaging the organization’s 
reputation and ability to acquire new work.  Figure 18 shows the desired process, 
emphasizing early risk mitigation in commercial shipbuilding programs (GAO, 2009b).  
While the naval acquisition community doesn’t have the same luxury of deciding to pass 
on a particular class of ships if it appears too risky, the process of early risk mitigation 
still offers benefits, leaving a program more capable of delivering performance on cost 
and schedule.      
 
Figure 18.  Commercial Practices: Risk Minimized Pre-Contract 




The commercial sector relies on several strategies to ensure that risks are 
minimized as early as possible.  One option is to reuse an existing design, rather than 
requiring a new design be created from scratch.  Using an existing design saves on the 
amount of design work that must be done, and historical data provides assurance to the 
customer that the design can be built and that the particular shipyard can build it for cost 
and on schedule.  This approach tailors nicely with collaborative PLM because all the 
data from previous designs are already in the system, so efforts can be spent updating and 
modernizing the design to meet current objectives.   
The GAO reported that Korean shipyards utilize this tactic as they maintain 
several standard designs for different classes of ships and allow customers to select and 
modify a design as necessary (GAO, 2009b).  The cruise ship industry has a similar tactic 
that may be more suited for defense programs.  The Royal Caribbean’s Freedom Class 
drew heavily off the design of its predecessor, the Voyager Class.  Even though the 
Freedom has a different hull and is 47 feet longer, it uses the propulsion system, power 
lines, and several other basic features designed for the Voyager.  The cruise industry also 
understands that the ships will undergo extensive revitalization and designs them 
accordingly.  These revitalizations have been as intensive as cutting the Royal Caribbean 
ship Enchantment of the Seas in half to add a new middle section of cabins, but they are 
more commonly used to introduce new features that were not mature enough to be 
included in the initial build. An example would be hydro-dynamically efficient ducktails 
to improve fuel efficiency (GAO, 2009b).  It is easier to resist the urge to insert immature 
technology when planned modernizations will ensure the ships will remain state of the 
art.      
 
 
Figure 19.  Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. Employment of Azipod Propulsion 
(From GAO, 2009b) 
 
The cost and schedule volatility experienced in DoD programs could be 
significantly reduced if we had the same discipline regarding technology insertion as 
commercial firms.  By discipline I mean that new technology would have to undergo 
modeling, testing, and simulations, to prove that it offers significant benefits to 
performance, or operational, and maintenance costs, before it would be included in 
designs.   
Figure 19 is the result of a case study conducted by the GAO, demonstrating how 
Royal Caribbean worked through the risks of integrating new azipods into its design 
(GAO, 2009b).  A collaborative PLM suite has several features that help the designers 
ensure that the appropriate level of risk is communicated about particular components.  
For instance, particular components in the 3D model can be color coded to ensure that 
high-risk items are highly visible.  Figure 20 shows how documents and data can be 
integrated directly into the model. For instance, if the designer saw the azipods were 
color coded red, they could click on the component and bring up amplifying data such as 
the mitigation plan and schedule, the testing schedule, or any other data necessary to 
communicate the situation of that particular component.  The designer could also attach a 
question directly to the component that would be answered by the particular point of 
contact for that component.  By integrating all the applicable data into the 3D model, it 
helps ensure warnings or red flags are not overlooked because they are spread out 
through a series of emails, reports, etc. (R. Langmead, personal communication, April 4, 
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2010).  If the technology cannot be matured to a point where both the buyer and the 
builder are confident that it will perform as expected and not delay delivery, then it will 
be discarded from consideration for the sake of program success.   
 
Figure 20. Information Can Be Imbedded Directly into 3D Model 
 (From Murphy, 1997) 
 
2. Navy Shipbuilding Programs Don’t Prioritize the Early Mitigation of 
 Risk 
The Navy approaches technology development differently than the commercial 
approach described in the previous section.  To ensure that our sailors always have the 
advantage in a fight, the Navy needs to deliver ships that have outpaced and overmatched 
all future threats.  To gain this advantage, naval acquisition programs are generally not 
restricted to proven technologies. Instead, they invest considerable resources developing 
and integrating cutting edge technologies that can meet mission requirements.  Unlike 
commercial shipbuilding counterparts, the Navy has been willing to assume the risk and 
enter contracts without fully functional prototypes, demonstrating technologies are 
mature enough to validate performance expectations.  This means that in situations where 
the commercial buyer and builder have full understanding of the requirements to design 
and build a particular ship and are confident enough to enter into a firm fixed-price 
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contract, the Navy has traditionally used a cost-plus contract, assuming the majority of 
the risks.  The GAO was able to capture this point in Figure 21, which highlights the 
differences between the assumptions of risk in naval versus commercial shipbuilding 
programs (GAO, 2009b).  
 
Figure 21.  Navy Practices: Significant Risks Remain Unresolved at Contract 
Award 
(From GAO, 2009b) 
 
Once the schedule starts slipping, certain risky practices are employed to try and 
recover lost time. Examples of risky practices could be trying to design and develop 
technology concurrently and starting construction before achieving a stable design.  For 
example, when designing around immature technology in order to keep the design 
progressing on schedule, shipbuilders must make assumptions about systems and 
equipment when actual information is not available, for instance a component’s size, 
weight, the heat generated by it, its vibration profile, and so on.  If the technology does 
not mature according to those assumptions, then the shipbuilder has to redesign entire 
aspects of the ship, rework portions already completed, and most likely conduct that work 
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in an inefficient sequence.  These types of practices are what preclude the Navy from 
finding a partner willing to agree to a fixed-price contract.    
In its current state, the Navy does not allocate sufficient time to engage all 
stakeholders in a manner similar to the commercial sector (P. Hudson, personal 
communication, April 6, 2010).  Instead, there is a race to understate costs and risks and 
become a program of record by rushing decisions on requirements and specifications.  If 
the LCS program, as illustrated in Figure 22, had taken the opportunity to engage in open 
dialog between stakeholders, it could have alleviated a lot of its headaches by realizing 
from the start that its $220-million and two-year build time was unachievable (GAO, 
2009b).  Inside a collaborative PLM environment, all of the stakeholders are integrated 
together through social networking tools, thus creating a culture where open 
communication is easier and problems become more transparent, helping to prevent 
designers and engineers from making incorrect assumptions during the design.   
 
 
Figure 22.  LCS Program Capsule 
(From GAO, 2009b) 
 
The Ford aircraft carrier (CVN 78), seen in Figure 23, is another example 
showing how the lack of early risk mitigation could jeopardize the success of a program.  
One of the foundational technologies on CVN-78 is the electromagnetic aircraft launch 
system (EMALS), a catapult that uses an electrically generated magnetic field, instead of 
steam, to accelerate aircraft to launch speeds.  The EMALS offers several advantages 
over steam, including improved sortie rate, less stress on the airframes due to more 
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controlled acceleration, and a reduced demand for fresh water. It also weighs less, 
requires less space, requires less maintenance and manpower, and is more reliable.  The 
downside is that it is an immature technology that has not been proven by an operational 
prototype.  Because work did not stop to wait to see how EMALS would evolve if the 
assumptions needed to be modified, it could result in major amounts of rework.  
Collaborative PLM would have given the design teams the ability to create a mirror of 
the CVN-78 design and progress one with EMALS and one with the traditional steam.  
This would have eliminated a portion of the risk: if EMALS fails and a plan B is needed, 
then an alternative to EMALS would be on the shelf, ready to go.               
 
 
Figure 23.  CVN-78 Program Capsule 
(From GAO, 2009b) 
 
The AEGIS project is an example of how the Navy has successfully reduced the 
risks of a new program.  Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard directed a number 
of actions when the contract was awarded, including the completion of a simplification 
effort to reduce complexity and costs.  The AEGIS program required the use of 
engineering development models.  Engineering development models are versions of the 
system that are used to demonstrate the system performance.  Once demonstrated, a 
second engineering development model could further the design moving on to the next, 
more complex version.  This testing program was referred to as, “Build a little, Test a 
little, Learn a lot.” And was based on incremental testing of function and components as 
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the system was built.  Hood argued, that the escalation of functionality and complexity 
was built upon a solid base of performance, and was a key element in reducing 
integration problems, increasing the chances of success (Hood, 2009).        
Technological development requires a different skill set than program 
management.  We are asking too much of our managers to try to maintain cost and 
schedule benchmarks based on a new technology that does not exist yet (P. Hudson, 
personal communication, April 6, 2010).  All of our programs would be better served by 
taking a lesson from the commercial sector; leave the technology development in the 
research labs.  Instead, we should produce designs based on proven technologies and plan 
for upgrades, once the technology becomes available.  Until this happens, collaborative 
PLM offers the capability to ensure that the data is organized in a fashion that increases 
the visibility of the risk so the appropriate attention can be assigned, as a portion of the 
risk can be mitigated by progressing two designs simultaneously, just in case one fails.    
D. SMART PRODUCTS CAN CLOSE THE DATA LOOP  
Smart products are products that can sense and communicate information about 
their condition and environment.  The idea is that information becomes knowledge on 
how to support existing products or create new and better ones.  Promise is an innovative 
project that has demonstrated how to use smart products to build on the capabilities of 
collaborative PLM, offering companies a new business model and new ways of creating 
value (Stark, 2010).  Most of the systems that the Navy operates already offer some 
degree of smart functionality, meaning that we have sensors in just about all of our 
equipment to monitor operating conditions and transmit it over networks to operators in, 
for instance, the control room or bridge.  However, the Promise program demonstrates 
that there are other potential benefits, and smart products with collaborative PLM can 
reform the acquisition portfolio, by converting a constant stream of data directly from the 
products into knowledge usable by the designers.   
 
1. Promise Project Concept 
The core concept of Promise (Figure 24) is that information captured by smart 
products can be transformed into knowledge that can be used to better support existing 
products, create new products, as well as service value (Kiritsis, Moseng, Rolstadås, & 
Røstad, 2008). One of the greatest weaknesses in the current product lifecycle is the 
barrier that prevents the flow of information between phases. For instance, once a product 
leaves, their area designers rarely get data on actual product use.  An attempt to address 
this weakness is the practice of hiring previous operators to design the new systems or 
involving current operators in the process to capitalize on the experience they each have. 
The Promise project demonstrates that there is a much better way to close the information 
loop.  
 
Figure 24. Promise Concept  
(From Kiritsis et al., 2008) 
 
The Promise project extends existing smart product and collaborative PLM 
technologies by using product embedded information devices (PEIDs) based on a 
combination of existing technologies, such as bar code, radio frequency identification 
(RFID) transponders, and short- and long-range wireless communication technologies. 
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Promise technologies are being tested in 11 demonstrations in the automotive, railway, 
heavy vehicle, electronics, and white-goods sectors (Stark, 2010).  The advantages and 
improvements identified by the Promise project demonstrate how the Navy could 
leverage these efforts.     
 
Closing the information loop creates benefits for many participants in the product 
lifecycle:  
• Customers get better products and services. 
• Manufacturers get more information about the conditions and modes of 
product use and disposal.  
• Service engineers get up-to-date information about the status of the 
product and its parts.  
• Product developers use real-life experience with previous products to 
improve future products, reduce over-engineering, and achieve lifecycle 
quality goals.  
• Recyclers get complete information about the EOL value of products, 
parts, and materials. (Stark, 2010). 
 
New services and improvements made possible with Promise include  
• Innovative products and services that go far beyond competitor offerings and 
are difficult for less-skilled competitors to copy. 
• Improved customer-relationship management based on up-to-date real-life 
product data.  
• Simplified product authentication and enhancement of product and user 
security and safety.  
• New types of product leasing and insurance services.  
• Improved maintenance and service at reduced cost. (Stark, 2010) 
 
2. Promise Project Demonstrations 
The Promise project completed 11 demonstrations proving the benefits and 
capabilities of these smart technologies.  All 11 showed unique ways that smart products 
could improve a company’s business model. A summary of one of the demonstrations 
from the Promise final report as well as a hypothetical naval application follow.       
a. Predictive Maintenance for Trucks 
The overall objective of this demonstrator is to support the maintenance of 
a fleet of cargo carrying semi trucks, optimizing the maintenance plan and increasing the 
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overall availability of the trucks.  The fleet of trucks worked under normal conditions, 
installed sensors, and collected and continuously updated operational data.  The data was 
transmitted via a wireless GPS link to a ground station, where the data was stored and 
processed through diagnostic algorithms to develop predictive information.  After 
analyzing the data, the ground station computer sends a maintenance schedule to each 
vehicle, garage, design department, production department, and supplier (Kiritsis et al., 
2008). 
(1) Objectives. The overall objective of the demonstrator is to 
support the maintenance of a fleet of trucks, optimizing the maintenance plan and 
increasing the overall availability of the trucks.  Closing the information loop for 
predictive maintenance will improve the knowledge of the customer, as well as the actual 
use profile of the vehicle, making it possible to:  
 
• Reduce the number of vehicle stops for maintenance, 
• Minimize the overall lifecycle costs of the components, 
• Avoid component breakdowns, 
• Take into account vehicle availability while planning maintenance interventions, 
and 
• Take into account maintenance crew availability for performing maintenance. 
(Kiritsis et al., 2008) 
 
(2) Naval Application. The theory behind this demonstration is 
that the trends in performance can offer a variety of benefits throughout the lifecycle.  
The Navy already understands the benefits of preventive maintenance and has a detailed 
maintenance schedule that is followed on each piece of equipment it owns.  However, 
these schedules are developed by the contractor based on lab-testing data. Each of our 
ships operates in a different manner in entirely different environments. It is unreasonable 
to expect the wear of a piece of equipment operating in the blowing sand of the Persian 
Gulf to mimic the results obtained in the lab.  To account for these differences, safety 
margins are built into the schedule. For instance, a part that is expected to fail at 36 
months will be replaced at 30 months.  Using smart technologies and collaborative PLM 
to capture the data, the ships will get a maintenance schedule based on actual 
performance, helping eliminate waste associated with replacing perfectly good parts, just 
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because of what month it is.  The maintainers will have a tool that can identify other 
problems based on a particular part wearing out faster on one ship versus another.  The 
suppliers can accurately forecast the part lifespan and increase operational availability by 
decreasing the normal downtime, during which they had to wait for a part to fail before 
they could order a replacement. 
A second naval example corrects the process of designers basing 
decisions on the sporadic and inaccurate information provided from the operators.  Smart 
products allow the designer to pull actual data from the product.  For instance, if a 
particular pump is designed to move 200 gallons per minute, from the operator’s 
perspective the pump might be perfect, as it has always performed as designed, and there 
have been no issues.  But the data directly from the pump may tell a different story. For 
instance, it may show during the entire operational life that the highest quantity ever 
moved was 100 gallons per minute, and this would indicate that the original pump was 
over-engineered. Thus, future design can more accurately reflect the expected operations. 
Designers can obtain data on the actual mission profile to assist in 
developing better products. They can also eliminate waste by noticing that a particular 
part has been over- or under- engineered.  All this can be accomplished automatically, 
inside a collaborative PLM environment, eliminating the time and errors typically 
associated with completing the tremendous amount of paperwork that currently is 
necessary in today’s process.              
E. GAINING CONTROL OVER TOTAL OWNERSHIP COSTS 
1. Commercial Companies Offer a Model on How to Address TOC  
Select commercial companies have experienced a competitive edge by 
deliberately managing and controlling TOC as a part of their acquisition-development 
process.  They strive to attain knowledge about their products as early in the 
developmental process as possible, they make sure the design is mature and stable prior 
to starting production, and they have the production processes under control before 
production begins.  Companies such as United Airlines, FedEx Express, and Polar Tanker 
strive to maintain the readiness of their fleets at as low an operational cost as possible—a 
strategy to increase profits and gain a market advantage.  As customers, they rate 
operational and support costs, product readiness, procurement costs, and performance 
requirements equally.  For example, United Airlines penalizes a supplier for lost revenue 
if the aircraft fails to maintain a readiness rate of 98.5%.  Polar Tanker drove trades 
during design, sometimes increasing development costs to achieve lower operating costs 
by making a requirement that its Endeavor Class tanker operate at least 330 days a year at 
a reduced operating cost per tanker. FedEx Express required the design of its new 
delivery truck to be able to operate for 300,000 miles at a specific cost per mile (GAO, 
2003b). 
b. Polar Tanker 
 
Figure 25.  Polar Tanker 
(From GAO, 2003b) 
 
Polar Tanker (see Figure 25) is a commercial oil-transportation company 
that designed a new tanker for its run between Puget Sound and Prince William Sound.  
The company had two requirements it deemed critical to its ability to reduce the cost of 
delivering oil:  (1) it required less expensive operations and maintenance over a 30-year 
lifecycle, thus increasing the industry standard lifecycle by 10 years; and (2) the tanker 
had to be operationally available for at least 330 days per year (GAO, 2003b). 
To design their new double-hulled tankers, the procurement team relied on 
the knowledge and experience of its maintenance engineers, along with archived 
maintenance data from other Alaskan operations.  The design team was able to make 
tradeoffs that reflected the low maintenance, high availability strategy for this tanker.  
For instance, the previous data collected revealed ballast-tank maintenance as one of the 
most significant cost maintenance burdens.  Based on this knowledge, the Polar 
 98
shipbuilder made the decision to use the most expensive epoxy coatings and specialized 
paints to protect the tanks from corrosion.  This is an example of how integrating the 
knowledge gained during sustainment can benefit the design.  Integrating knowledge 
throughout the lifecycle is the cornerstone of collaborative PLM applications.   
Another lesson to take away from this program was its use of the 
modeling and simulation tools to improve the design.  Polar Tanker assessed the fatigue 
cracking in the hulls of its fielded fleet and used this data in modeling tools to determine 
what structural changes would result in the optimal structure.  These are just two 
examples of Polar Tanker trading higher design costs (about $25 million) for lower TOC 
(GAO, 2003b). 
c. United Airlines/Boeing  
 
Figure 26.  United Airlines 
(From GAO, 2003b) 
 
United Airlines (see Figure 26) established strict requirements regarding 
readiness and operation cost for the new Boeing 777, ensuring reliability was an 
important design element.  United specified that the new plane had to be capable of flying 
extended ranges from any U.S. airport, that it not exceed current operational and supports 
costs, and that it be available at the gate within 15 minutes of departure 98.5% of the 
time.  If Boeing fell short, they agreed to compensate United for lost revenue. Reliability 
was highly valued by United in its new plane (GAO, 2003b). 
Boeing approached the design for its new aircraft, just as Polar approached 
the tanker, by merging the experience of experts and the operations and maintenance 
histories of its current planes.  They assigned engineers to shadow the planes’ 
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maintenance crews to collect data.  The data history led them to the root causes behind 
maintenance failures, and the experienced experts gave insight into how to resolve the 
issues.  The result was a team focused on delivering the strategic value held by its 
customer: an easy-to-repair aircraft (GAO, 2003b).   
The previous section introduced smart products, which can communicate 
directly with the collaborative PLM systems, preventing the need for engineers to shadow 
the design team.  The products themselves will create the data history, and depending 
how automated the analysis tools are, collaborative PLM could use the data to perform 
analysis and recommend a solution for engineer approval.     
d. FedEx Express 
 
Figure 27.  FedEx Express 
(From GAO, 2003b) 
 
The FedEx Express’s mission (see Figure 27) is to provide global air and 
ground transportation of high-priority goods and documents that require rapid, time-
certain delivery.  It is easy to understand why high availability, high reliability, and low 
operating cost would be very valuable in the fleet of vehicles operated to accomplish this 
mission.  When designing the new fleet of trucks, FedEx, just as the other examples, 
created an integrated team consisting of design engineers, suppliers, a logistics expert, 
maintainers, as well as their own representatives.  The result was a new 700 cubic-foot 
truck that averages 70,000 miles between breakdowns, while operating below FedEx’s 
established cost-per-mile threshold (GAO, 2003b).  FedEx created manually an integrated 
team that spanned the entire lifecycle to ensure that one phase or feature was not 
maximized at the expense of another.   This is the same approach collaborative PLM 
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takes as data and knowledge are integrated across the lifecycle.  Social networking tools 
built into the collaborative PLM system can create virtual teams to produce an integrated 
design, without physically dislocating the team members from their primary functions.   
2. Use of Feedback to Better Understand Customers’ Needs 
The examples from Polar, Boeing and FedEx show that leading commercial 
companies consider it essential to collect and analyze data from fielded systems.  
Tracking the actual operating cost, reliability of parts, and readiness of systems offers the 
ability to validate the processes and estimates created during design.  A collaborative 
process between the customer and developer seems to be able to positively influence the 
design of new products by drawing extensively from past and current operations.  Boeing 
has personnel residing with the airlines to assist as problems arise. They also feed all 
relevant information back to the designers to improve the next product.   
United conducts a quarterly meeting with representatives from across the lifecycle 
to discuss open issues with operational aircraft and develop short- and long-term 
solutions.  United also monitors flight movements on a computer system that records 
each aircraft by tail number.  This monitoring is much more than a record of the 
maintenance history of each aircraft. It can report problems requiring corrective actions 
on a current flight so that ground crews can be prepared upon landing.  It tracks statistics 
and operational parameters, and recommends preventive maintenance based on the actual 
performance instead of an estimated calendar approach.  Completing this preventive 
maintenance not only decreases the probability of a catastrophic failure, but also offers 
the ability to schedule the maintenance to be completed at a time and location that is both 
convenient and cost effective, for instance, at the maintenance hub rather than a remote 
field that lacks the necessary mechanics, parts, and tools.   
This data has several useful applications for Boeing: it lets them know how it can 
improve future iterations of the product, develop better preventive maintenance 
schedules, provide better estimates of the operating and support costs, and refine 
reliability requirements for future products (GAO, 2003b).  All of these are examples of 
possibilities, once our organization is operating inside a collaborative PLM environment.      
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The Navy shipbuilding acquisition community could apply collaborative PLM in 
a similar fashion with similar results.  The Navy could use collaborative PLM to capture 
actual data during the operation and sustainment phases as a method to improve the 
knowledge available to designers during the design phase.  Analysis of system failures or 
maintenance data, or sailor inputs could be used to improve the design, or justify higher 
acquisition costs to purchase systems with reduced TOC.   
3. TOC Hard to Control in Current Linear Acquisition Strategy   
The current DoD strategy employs a linear approach to setting requirements, 
developing, and fielding a system (Figure 28) (GAO, 2003b).  Three key groups are 
involved during this process.  First, there is a warfighter service based requirements 
community that establishes what the requirements will be for the new system.  Second, 
there are acquisition organizations tasked to design and produce a product to meet the 
established requirements.  During this phase, the majority of effort is spent on developing 
revolutionary performance technologies while keeping acquisition costs as low as 
possible.    Finally, once the product is delivered, it is turned over to the warfighter for 
operations and maintenance.  One of the problems with this current process is that there is 
not much communication between the three groups.  Decisions made when establishing 
the requirements have a dramatic effect on the overall system.  Tradeoffs made during 
design usually are to maximize the performance capabilities identified in the 
requirements.  By the time the operators and maintainers are brought into process they 
can have very little influence and have no alternative but to pay the support bills and try 
and figure out workarounds to maintain readiness (GAO, 2003b). 
 
Figure 28.  DoD Linear Acquisition Process 
(From GAO, 2003b) 
4. How the Navy Can Reduce TOC  
The DoD has similar policy goals as the commercial firm’s best practices, and the 
DoD desires to deliver products that will not only meet performance requirements, but 
also do so at the lowest possible cost to build and operate.  Where DoD and commercial 
firms diverge is the manner in which each implements these policy goals.  The private 
sector operates in an integrated, collaborative manner from requirement definition 
through design, production, operations, and support.  The current DoD process 
encompasses several separate organizations with different objectives and little 
communication between them.  For instance, Naval Shipyards are responsible for 
conducting maintenance on aircraft carriers.  A shipyard has a knowledge base built on 
seeing components that have failed, an understanding why they fail and knowing how 
they must be repaired, this would be valuable knowledge for ship designers.  
While both understand the integrated lifecycle, commercial firms have made TOC 
a priority from the outset. Until very recently, the DoD has been focused mainly on 
technical performance. Several possible reasons exist for this behavior. Responsibility for 
TOC is spread across many organizations, and, as a result, no one is held accountable. 
The metric used to justify killing a program is acquisition costs, so managers will do 
anything necessary to keep that as low as possible.  The private firms discussed earlier 
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(United, Polar Tanker, and FedEx Express) must manage TOC to remain profitable to 
survive. The DoD does not have the same incentive. Table 7 shows a GAO comparison 
of practices between commercial firms and the DoD.  If more operation and maintenance 
money is needed, the next budget request simply requests the additional funds to keep the 
systems online (GAO, 2003b). 
 
Table 7.  DoD and Commercial Practices for Controlling Operating and 
Support Costs 
(From GAO, 2003b) 
 
 
a. Change the Requirements to More Specifically Address TOC 
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The GAO cited the lack of accountability and responsibility as one of the 
primary reasons for the out of control TOC (GAO, 2003b).  Cited in a previous 
recommendation, the NDO should be held accountable for the quality of design, as TOC 
falls under his or her responsibility.  To evaluate the completeness of the design, the 
NDO should use a tool such as the LEAN design scorecard spider charts from Chapter 
IV.D.  This change should help ensure that the DoD and the Navy understand the total 
picture and do not get too focused on a particular aspect, such as performance, basically 
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making the Navy a smart buyer.  The Navy must also use the data collected by 
collaborative PLM to develop other predictive metrics.  For instance, do 90% of drawings 
released by a particular milestone demonstrate design stability and correctly forecast a 
program’s probability for success?     
b. Use Evolutionary as Opposed to Revolutionary Technology 
In several different sections, the characteristic of commercial firms 
eliminating immature technologies from consideration has been touted as a major 
contributor to their success.  While collaborative PLM technologies do not necessarily 
help with the physical technology maturity, they can play a dramatic role in the execution 
of evolutionary acquisition.  Figure 29 is a graphic from a GAO report on the F-22 
program. It illustrates the difference between the two approaches (GAO, 2003a).  
Revolutionary development would be a program that attempts to develop immature 
technology in the program.    In the GAO’s example, the warfighter had a requirement for 
a new aircraft but had to wait 15 years before anything was delivered. All too often, the 
product delivered has morphed and fails to satisfy the original need or the need has 
changed during the multiple years of development.   
The preferred approach is evolutionary product development, in which the 
requirements are met over several generations of the product.  In the GAO example, the 
first generation incorporates the needs of the warfighter and the available technology 
from the research labs.  The warfighter is delivered the first generation platform at the 
five-year point.  This is when a collaborative PLM can offer substantial benefits to the 
process. Once the warfighter has the first generation, they can begin to offer feedback to 
the designers who are working on the second generation.  Feedback could be likes, 
dislikes, correcting misinterpretations of the requirements, changes to the need, or others.  
The smart products themselves are communicating with the designer about how they are 
performing or leading to improvements.  Additionally, the research labs may have new 
technology that is now mature enough for integration into the second-generation 
 
 
platform.  This process repeats, and each successive generation of product evolves into 
exactly what the warfighter needs, while never accepting undue risk from immature 
technologies.               
 
Figure 29.  Evolutionary Versus Revolutionary Development Comparison 
(From GAO, 2003a) 
 
Virginia class submarine is an example of a design with planned 
technology insertion over the life of the ship. For example, the structurally integrated 
enclosures are designed with shockproof supports and necessary services to allow for 
change out of COTS electronic units; the universal modular masts can easily accept new 
sensors in the sail; and the baseline ship design has a high reserve buoyancy to 
accommodate future weight growth. In addition, the modular construction method used 
on USS Virginia facilitates technology insertion, since equipment can be removed and 
replaced as individual packages (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002). 
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Electric Boat continues to plan upgrades to the Virginia class to reach 
visions captured in the Submarine Futures Studies Group report of July 2000. The Navy 
has proposed an upgrade path to reach the 2020 vision with specific upgrades proposed 
for later ships of the class (see Figure 30). For example, technologies that have almost 
reached a level of maturity that eliminate the risk that prohibited prior insertion include: 
an advanced sail, improved payloads and sensors, and a large-aperture conformal array. 
By 2020, the submarine would be all-electric with fully modular payloads, external 
weapons, a “smart skin,” high-rate communications at depth and speed, and increased 
automation (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002).  The Virginia class program has 
been designed inside a collaborative PLM application, making the technology insertion 
easier as well as maintaining several configurations of the class of ships to reflect the as 
designed, as constructed, and as maintained of each hull.   
 
 
Figure 30.  Virginia Class Program Planned Technology Insertion 




c. Close the Feedback Loop 
While discussing smart products in the section “d. Smart Products Can 
Close the Data Loop,” some of the benefits of closing the information loop were 
explored.  Having good communications between each phase of the lifecycle will also 
help control TOC, and the tools to foster solid communications are built into every 
collaborative PLM.  Each collaborative PLM platform is different, but they all deliver 
similar capabilities.  Some of the various options are standard email points of contact 
built into the design files. For instance, if a sailor has a question about troubleshooting a 
particular component, he can access the 3D model, click on the particular part, and access 
any point of contact built into the system, from designers to maintainers to an engineer or 
supplier.  There are more advanced options, such as video collaboration, in which several 
people can chat while working together in the system.  Some of the platforms are even 
developing Facebook-like social-networking capabilities that allow people from 
specialized areas to congregate and troubleshoot.  The section on smart products 
demonstrated how communication is not limited to people, but the products themselves 
can communicate, inputting knowledge into the system that can be used to create 
improved systems.            
F. DESIGN MATURITY 
1. Design Stability of the Private Sector 
Commercial shipbuilding typically defines a design as stable when both the basic 
and functional designs are complete (see Table 8). Until this stability is achieved, they 
will not move into the construction phase.  Usually the product is a complete 3D product 
model, demonstrating a clear understanding of both the structure, as well as every system 
and how those systems integrate into the building blocks of the ship (GAO, 2008a).  
Integrating suppliers into the process is very important to design stability, as they not 
only provide a complete set of data for their respective systems, but also are the experts 
in their fields and can offer valuable insight to the integration into the total ship.   
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Table 8.  Description of Design Phases 


















Bringing the vendors on board and not relying on immature technology are the 
best ways to quickly progress the design and lock in system requirements such as power, 
water, and other utilities.  The ability to gain this high level of knowledge early reduces 
the possibility of very costly design changes after spaces have been closed out.   
During the LPD-17 program Avondale Industries, Bath Iron Works, Ingalls 
Shipbuilding, National Steel and Shipbuilding, and Newport News Shipbuilding were 
contracted to provide technical services during concept design.  These shipyards provided 
significant inputs on subjects such as metrication, less reliance on military specifications 
and standards, corrosion control, materials, and producibility. Nevertheless, Keane, 
McIntire, et al. (2009) argue that a greater investment at this stage of design could have 
paid big dividends. However, since this level of involvement was not factored into the 
initial planning for the program it was not adequately funded (p. 29).   
Involving the shipbuilder in the early design allows for the selected vendors to be 
brought into the design process much earlier.  During the detail design, the design team 
benefits greatly from early access to the vendor furnished information.  For example, for 
communication between electric plant devices the vendor selected by the shipbuilder for 
LPD-17 Class power distribution management used a proprietary Local Area Network 
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(LAN) that was very difficult to integrate. This LAN was not addressed in the 
shipbuilding specifications because it was not anticipated; if it had, an effort would have 
been made to either avoid its use or, make the necessary accommodations (Keane, 
McIntire, et al., 2009).  Having to constantly go back and fix seemingly harmless changes 
wreaks havoc on a schedule, with cascading effects throughout the design.     
The previous sections have discussed the design team’s advantages by working 
with the buyers and the vendors. They must also work with members of their own yard to 
ensure that the design is highly producible.  This producibility concept is achieved when 
the design is successfully matched to the capabilities and production techniques of the 
particular shipyard, so the ship can be efficiently constructed.  Activities associated with 
design for producibility could be collaboration between the construction and design 
teams or using common parts, components, and processes that support multiple ships, in 
order to take advantage of the learning curve (GAO, 2010).  The capabilities of 
collaborative PLM technologies have assisted commercial companies with both of these 
activities through collaboration capabilities, as well as improving the visibility into the 
design to help identify trouble before it ever becomes critical.           
2. Design Volatility of the Public Sector 
The lack of early systems engineering and risk mitigation has led to the volatility 
plaguing Navy programs.  Starting construction before the design is stable, a common 
occurrence for Navy programs, increases the probability of costly out-of-sequence work 
and rework.  For example, maturing a particular technology concurrently with design and 
construction opens the possibility to a considerable amount of volatility to the design 
process.  As the technology matures, the initial assumptions about size, shape, weight, as 
well as energy requirements and byproducts may change significantly.   
For example, the Seawolf class attack submarine  (see Figure 31) relied on a new 
computer-aided detection, classification, and tracking radar, the AN/BSY-2, to complete 
its mission requirements.  The design progressed with a space and weight reserved for the 
system. However, the system did not mature as the Navy expected, and it turned out to be 
 
bigger and heavier than expected.  This caused the need for a considerable redesign of the 




Figure 31.  SSN-21 Program Capsule 
(From GAO, 2009b) 
 
Each new design is in response to a new mission requirement that will likely use a 
new technology, making it easier to start a design from scratch rather than modify 
anything already in existence.  The Virginia class (SSN 774 class) submarine was a 
positive example of how a collaborative PLM application offers improved capabilities, 
for instance, how a new design could leverage off past efforts by reusing a number of 
components and systems tested on previous submarines.      
 
Figure 32.  Percentage of Work Package Issued, Virginia Versus Seawolf  
(General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
 111
Figure 32 shows the drawing release history for the USS Virginia  compared with 
the USS Seawolf. The x = 0 point is the construction-start date for each program, October 
1989 for Seawolf, and October 1998 for Virginia. The date of this chart is February 2002 
(the vertical line); thus, all Virginia data to the right of x = +3.3 are projections, whereas 
all Seawolf data are actual. Virginia had released 99.1% of all drawings by February 
2002, about 3.5 years earlier than Seawolf.  
 
 
Figure 33.  Mature Virginia (SSN-774) Design Results in Fewer Changes During 
Construction 
(From General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
The Virginia IPPD team and process created a more mature design to support 
construction. Figure 33 shows that 50% of the Virginia design had been issued prior to 
construction start, compared to 5.6% for USS Seawolf (SSN 21) and 1.6% for USS Ohio 
(SSBN 726).  The Electric Boat team had a disciplined strategy to keep contracts and 
requirements stable, and Figure 34 shows the pay off.  The figure shows the projection 
for contract changes are about 12% of Seawolf’s and 0.46% of Ohio’s (General 




Figure 34.  Virginia (SSN-774) Contract Changes (1/29/02)  
(From General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002) 
 
Not having to spend time designing everything from scratch was a contributing 
factor to the ability to have a complete 3D model prior to construction start.  This model 
was a contributing factor to the small number of design change orders (GAO, 2009a). 
This design volatility has been a major root cause behind the cost escalation in Navy 
programs. The cost escalation is the byproduct of the risk that was never removed and 
precluded the use of more advantageous contract vehicles, such as firm-fixed price.   
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VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The defense acquisition community is responsible to design, build, and deliver 
some of the most technologically advanced machines in existence.  Since 2002, Congress 
has appropriated over $74.1 billion for the construction of new aircraft carriers, nuclear 
submarines, surface combatants, and amphibious transport ships (GAO, 2009b).  
However, a 2010 review of 96 defense acquisition programs showed the average delivery 
rates are 22 months behind schedule, with a cumulative cost growth that exceeded $296 
billion.  These are indications that the acquisition community has room to improve the 
execution of its programs.  Compounding the current inefficient use of funds is the high 
probability of defense budget cuts.  Unless budget cuts are accompanied by a 
corresponding cut in missions, the Navy will need a more efficient utilization of dollars 
to fulfill all tasking.  This leaves a small window of opportunity to enact reforms 
improving the health and solvency of the defense acquisition portfolio.   
Sean J. Stackley (Prepared Testimony, 2009), Under Secretary of the Navy, said:  
Inarguably the underlying challenge, the pressing requirement, before us 
today in shipbuilding is affordability. 
The reality is that there is no single fix to turn around this trend, but rather 
a large number of initiatives, practices, and standards that we need to 
attack across the board. 
We need to ensure that our requirements are balanced by our resources. .... 
The key here is to inform the process with realistic cost estimates and 
realistic risk assessments at the front end. This drives the difficult 
decisions early, where there are true choices, and true opportunities.  
The Navy has the opportunity to fundamentally transform the acquisition 
community by enacting reforms addressing some of the root causes behind the cost 
escalation and schedule delays during procurement and by making conscious decisions 
that will reduce TOC.  The Navy can make more efficient use of the appropriated budget 
by addressing these root causes.   
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This research was a search for answers to the following two research questions:  
1. How can a technology such as collaborative product lifecycle management (PLM) 
be used to improve the acquisition process?  
 
2. What reforms to the acquisition process are possible, complimenting or 
supplementing the capabilities provided by collaborative PLM, helping ensure 
value is optimized throughout the lifecycle of the product?   
 
Collaborative PLM can offer the acquisition community features and capabilities 
that can be used to positively reform the acquisition process.  Being able to record, 
organize, then leverage the tremendous amount of data generated in a new ship design 
program is paramount to the decision makers making quality choices from the total 
lifecycle perspective.  PLM also offers the ability to integrate data across the entire 
acquisition portfolio, a feature when coupled with the social networking capability can 
eliminate redundant efforts and increase the reuse and commonality between programs.   
 Answering those questions led to the reforms recommended throughout the paper 
and reiterated in the Summary of Recommendations for Action section below.  Together, 
they show a path that the acquisition community can follow to improve as an 
organization and move the portfolio of programs toward solvency.  The reforms will 
affect the three main elements of the community: its organization, people, information, 
technology, processes, and practices.  The synergy between each of these elements means 
that reforms collectively working together will produce a result not obtainable by anyone 
acting independently. 
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 Invest in a collaborative PLM suite that can be utilized by the entire Navy 
acquisition enterprise.  Product lifecycle management is an integrated, 
information-driven approach to all aspects of a product’s life, from its design 
through manufacture, deployment, and maintenance, culminating in the product’s 
removal from service and final disposal.  Collaborative PLM software suites such 
as Siemen's Teamcenter, PTC's Windchill, or Dassault's Enovia, each enable 
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accessing, updating, manipulating, and reasoning about product information that 
is otherwise being produced in a fragmented and distributed environment.   
Collaborative PLM applications will allow team members to link data 
from various sources, to all other program structures to ensure that the 
relationships and interdependencies are understood.  This understanding will lead 
to participants having a real time knowledge or a program status, requirements, 
issues, changes, reviews, operations, and so on.  The collaborative PLM 
environment can effectively manage data, more effectively manage 
configurations, improve collaboration and networking, and integrate applications 
and tools across the entire lifecycle.  These benefits are just a few of the ways 
collaborative PLM can deliver efficiencies that have the potential to dramatically 
reduce TOC.    
 Apply the LEAN Product Design philosophy to the design process.   
Collaborative PLM was created to manage a product and its associated data 
throughout the lifecycle, from cradle to grave.  LEAN is a strategy to remove 
waste throughout processes, saving the resources expended on wasteful activities.  
The data collected and organized inside the collaborative PLM environment will 
be used to accomplish the LEAN analysis identifying wasteful processes.  Once 
the more efficient process is identified, collaborative PLM has the capability to 
automate the workflow and institutionalize the efficient processes, making both 
data and processes accessible to users throughout the lifecycle, which will 
eliminate repetition, redundancy, errors, and other forms of waste.   
 Create a National Design Organization. This design organization would be 
responsible to conduct the preliminary design of every new ship-building 
program.  The repetitions through the design process would create a very 
experienced design team that was intimately familiar with the collaborative PLM 
tools and how to translate requirements and knowledge into a good ship design.  
The NDO would also be responsible for grooming new engineers, provide a focal 
point for fleet feedback and conduct design exercises to populate the collaborative 
PLM idea bank, improve standby designs and integrate new technology into 
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current designs.  They will establish and maintain design and engineering 
standards used during naval shipbuilding programs, and manage the development 
of mature analytic tools required during design and certification.  
 Establish and maintain product data interoperability standards.  PDI will 
make cross-program collaboration possible.  PDI will provide a consistent format 
for data, establishing standards required for the development of applications to be 
integrated into the collaborative PLM suite.  PDI will format data to ensure it is 
useful during each phase of the lifecycle, which will enable collaboration between 
phases of the lifecycle, thus allowing designers to focus on improving the product.  
 Develop and integrate design and certification applications inside the 
collaborative PLM suite.    NAVSEA can improve the design and engineering 
tools and applications available to assist its engineers in making sound decisions 
while evaluating the multiple options of a particular design.  These new tools 
could be developed in academia or in the public or private sector by ensuring that 
they conform to the data interoperability standards maintained by the NDO.  
Thus, they will be easily integrated into the collaborative PLM suite, making 
utilization across the acquisition portfolio easier.   
 Institute requirements to use common parts catalog.   Once a part or 
component is entered into the collaborative PLM system, any designer with 
access can use it.  During a design, the common catalog can be accessed and the 
part can by dragged and dropped into the current design, saving the cost and time 
designing and testing a new part.  Decreasing the number of unique parts across 
the Navy will reduce the strain on the logistics pipeline, will decrease the number 
of parts sailors must learn to operate and maintainers must learn to fix.    
 Retire risk as early in the process as possible, to decrease the volatility of our 
programs.  Every part in the collaborative PLM system has product data captured 
and stored; this data could be everything related to its design, testing, and actual 
operational performance.  As more knowledge is captured inside the collaborative 
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PLM system, the risk of an unexpected event occurring decreases.  As the 
percentage of reused components in a design is increased, the risk of the entire 
system decreases.   
 Employ smart products to automate the communication of information 
throughout the lifecycle into the collaborative PLM suite.  Smart products are 
products that can sense and communicate information about their condition and 
environment.  For instance as an engine communicates its performance data, trend 
lines develop, and these trend lines can be used to plan maintenance prior to any 
part failing. Scheduling preventive maintenance based on actual performance will 
reduce TOC.  Thus, parts will only be replaced when failing, instead of on the 
date recommended by the vendor.    
 Change program requirement to more specifically address TOC.  
Establishing operating and support costs and readiness is a key parameter during 
the design.  Using the capability of collaborative PLM to reduce part counts will 
decrease the number of unique parts and standardize parts across the acquisition 
portfolio.   
Ensure the collaborative PLM data is transferred and utilized throughout 
the lifecycle; for instance, the 3D model can be used during the initial build as 
well as during future ship alterations.      
 Use the evolutionary versus revolutionary approach concerning technology 
insertion.  Evolutionary product development, in which the requirements are met 
over several generations of the product, offers advantages over revolutionary 
technology insertion.  This method decreases the risk associated with maturing 
technology concurrently with the design and construction of a new ship.   
Once the warfighter is delivered the first generation platform, 
collaborative PLM can help designers improve the second generation by 
facilitating collaboration between the operators and the designers.  Feedback 
could be likes, dislikes, correcting misinterpretations of the requirements, and 
changes to the need or others.  The smart products themselves can communicate 
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with the designer leading to improvements based on how the parts are performing, 
or determining if they were over- or under -engineered.  Additionally, the research 
labs may have new technology that is now mature enough for integration into the 
second-generation platform.  This process repeats, and each successive generation 
of product evolves into exactly what the warfighter needs, while never accepting 
undue risk from immature technologies.    
 Reduce design volatility to decrease overall program risk.  Design stability is 
usually achieved when the 3D model is complete, demonstrating a clear 
understanding of both the structure as well as every system and how those 
systems integrate into the building blocks of the ship.  Collaborative PLM can 
assist the design team with integrating the applicable data and ensure that 
elements are not overlooked or omitted, efforts necessary to achieve design 
stability.  PLM collaboration tools can help integrate suppliers into the process, 
which is very important to design stability, as they not only provide a complete 
set of data for their respective systems, but also are the experts in their fields and 
can offer valuable insight to the integration into the total ship.   
B. CLOSING REMARKS  
The reforms recommended in this research are not revolutionary; in fact, if you 
look back at one of the most successful programs in DoD history you will see that most 
of the principles have already been successfully implemented.  With the AEGIS program, 
the Navy for the first time embarked on a total “systems” development.  Systems 
engineering became the basis for the entire program, from initial weapon system 
development, through design and construction of the ship, to development of the 
operation and the support infrastructure.  Rear Admiral Hood who served as the Combat 
Systems Engineer, Technical Director, and Program Manager during the AEGIS 
program, recalled that the systems engineering process for AEGIS was guided by the firm 
hand of “the father of AEGIS,” RADM Wayne Meyer (Hood, 2009, p. 187).  Hood 
outlines some of the processes and beliefs that led to the success of the program, such as:  
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 Early and constant involvement of sailors, as well as frequently sending 
industry engineers to sea, was required.  This process “closed the information 
loop,” engineers understood what it meant to go to sea and sailors were intimately 
involved in designing the warship they needed.   
 No one was allowed to work in isolation—teamwork was mandatory.  Naval 
engineers, laboratory scientists, contractors, and sailors were brought together to 
collaborate.  Each person’s different skill set created a synergy that inspired true 
innovation.   
 Field Activities were enlisted to work on the right problem.  AEGIS was 
cutting edge technology and the smartest people were employed to work through 
problems.  Various Navy activities were recruited to solve problems in their 
specialized area.  Even those that were not directly assigned to the AEGIS 
program became “AEGIS people.” 
 Contracts were structured to achieve flexibility and facilitate 
communications.  The contractor and government worked together to ensure that 
immediate corrective actions were taken when necessary, providing near real time 
guidance and feedback.  Meyer made it clear the principle involved was “do 
what’s right, we'll sort out the contracts and payments later.”  
 Only what could be proved at sea was taken to sea.  Technology was proven 
with a series of engineering development model prior to being included in the 
design.  This helped eliminate setbacks caused by immature technology (Hood, 
2009, p. 187–190).        
 
The Navy has the opportunity to institutionalize the principles RADM Meyer and 
the AEGIS program.  A comprehensive collaborative PLM suite, accompanied by these 
reforms, has the ability to fundamentally change how we design, build, and maintain the 
fleet, making the defense portfolio solvent.  Both of the major defense contractors, 
General Dynamics (DDG 1000, SSN 774) and Northrop Grumman (LPD 17, CVN 78, 
SSN 774), already employ collaborative PLM applications during their phase of the ship 
design process.  Like them, the Navy has the opportunity to build on their efforts to create 
an enterprise-wide collaborative PLM solution capable of supporting the entire 
shipbuilding portfolio throughout the entire lifecycle.  Without collaborative PLM and 
drastic reforms to the acquisition community, the systems and platforms the Navy needs 
to meet its national strategic missions might never be delivered.   
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